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Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA:
Conflicting Signals from the Court and the Board
TE RtY A. BETHEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions the Supreme Court and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board' have confronted the controversial problem of whether the national
Labor Relations Act2 protects individual employees who register complaints
or take action intended to protest their own working conditions or those of
their co-workers. The problem stems from the language of section 7 of the
Act, which grants to employees the rights to form and support unions, to
bargain collectively and "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 3 The literal
language of the NLRA protects those employees who act in concert; it says
nothing about protecting those who act alone. The courts of appeals and,
to a lesser degree, the NLRB have made much of this apparent distinction
between concerted and individual activity.
In a recent law review article, Professors Gorman and Finkin argue forcefully
that both the history and policy of the Act negate any congressional intention
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Board or the NLRB. The Board is an administrative agency
created by the Congress in sections 3-6 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156
(1982). The Board's principal functions are enforcement of the unfair labor practice provisions
found in section 8 of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 158) and administration of the election procedure
in section 9 (29 U.S.C. § 159).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as the NLRA]. The Act was adopted
in 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, and is sometimes referred to as the Wagner Act. It was substan-
tially amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, sometimes
referred to as the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
3. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). The complete text of section 7
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)].
If an employee's conduct is protected by section 7, an employer who retaliates against the employee
on account of that conduct (typically, although not always, by discharge or other discipline)
commits an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
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to protect only the actions of two or more employees, while leaving those
who act alone at the whim of their employers.' The authors argue that section
7 is silent as to individual activity, not because Congress wished to leave it
unprotected, but because the fights of individuals had not been at issue during
the years preceding the Wagner Act.' Stated differently, Congress expressly
protected concerted activity in order to expand the rights of workers, not to
diminish them.
In terms of statutory construction, there are not two abstract and
distinguishable categories of action ... one which Congress chose not
to protect and the other which Congress chose to protect, but rather a
continuum of individual activity.6
Despite the impressive historical, statutory and practical arguments
marshalled by Gorman and Finkin, and despite decisions by the NLRB that
critics claimed all but obliterated the distinction between concerted and
individual activity, both the Board and the courts have adhered to the posi-
tion that only concerted activity enjoys the protection of the statute. While
maintaining that posture, however, Board decisions, at least until recently,
had blurred the distinction, primarily through the fiction of "constructive
concerted activity." Thus, action by an individual that seeks to enforce the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement or that claims the protection
of occupational safety and health legislation, or even action that is merely
"for the benefit of" and a "matter of mutual concern to" other employees,
fell within the Board's definition of concerted activity.7
In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,8 the Supreme Court, by a narrow
margin, endorsed the theory of constructive concerted activity so far as it
relates to attempts by individuals to enforce or claim the protection of a
collective bargaining agreement. Rejecting (though virtually ignoring) a claim
by the dissenters that its decision would undermine labor arbitration agreements
by authorizing the NLRB to determine contractual disputes, 9 the majority,
through Justice Brennan, upheld the Board's theory as a reasonable inter-
pretation of the Act.'" Interestingly, at about the time the Supreme Court
4. Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of Concert Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286 (1981). Others have also written about the meaning
of concerted activity in section 7. See, e.g., Note, Protection of Individual Action As "Con-
certed Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 369 (1983); Note,
Individual Reports for Organized Employees Under the National labor Relations Act, 58 TEx.
L. REv. 991 (1980); Note, The Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro and the Doctrine of Constructive
Concerted Activity-ARO, Inc. v. NLRB Leaves Non-Union Employees at the Mercy of Their
Bosses; 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 1045 (1979); Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action Under
the NLRA, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 514 (1953).
5. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 329-46.
6. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 334-35.
7. See infra note text accompanying notes 14, 20, 30, 52, 90-105.
8. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
9. Id. at 1516-19.
10. Id. at 1516. See infra text accompanying notes 90-108 for a detailed discussion of City
Disposal.
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accepted constructive concerted activity in City Disposal, the Board rejected
it, albeit in a different context, in Meyers Industries." In their respective deci-
sions, both the Board and the Court took pains to limit their action. The
Board noted that City Disposal was pending before the Court, but asserted
that the issues were distinguishable since no collective bargaining agreement
existed in Meyers.'2 In City Disposal, the majority noted the Board's asser-
tion that the cases were inapposite and concluded that Meyers was "of no
relevance here.'1 3
While the theory of constructive concerted activity has been applied to
disparate factual settings and while City Disposal and Meyers are
distinguishable on the facts, neither case adequately addresses the crucial ques-
tion of whether the Act protects any form of individual (as opposed to
concerted) activity. Nor was either case decided correctly. The Meyers opinion
is much too narrow; City Disposal unjustifiably injects the Board into the
enforcement of collectively bargained rights.
A. Constructive Concerted Activity
1. The NLRB's Opinion
Directly at issue in Meyers was a 1975 decision called Alleluia Cushion Co.' 4
in which the Board had held protected the complaint by a single employee
(Henley) to the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
Henley had not discussed his action with fellow employees; none of them
joined in it; and the Board noted "the absence of any outward manifestation
of support for his efforts."' 5 That fact, however, was not sufficient "to
establish that Respondent's employees did not share Henley's interest in safety
or that they did not support his complaints.' '1 6 The Board said that employees
had a "vital interest" in safe working conditions (recognized by Congress
in the Occupational Safety and Health Act),' 7 noted that most of Henley's
complaints would improve, not his own working conditions, but those of his
colleagues," and concluded that
[it would be incongruous with the public policy enunciated in such
occupational safety legislation ... to presume that, absent any outward
manifestation of support, Henley's fellow employees did not agree with
11. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984).
12. Id., 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 1510 n.7.
14. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
15. Id. at 1000.
16. Id.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). The Act permits states to assume responsibility for enforce-
ment of safety and health standards. Id. § 667.
18. Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. at 999 n.3.
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his efforts to secure compliance with the statutory obligations imposed
on Respondent for their benefit.' 9
The Board said that concerted action was implicit in the assertion of statutory
rights by one employee, at least "in the absence of any evidence that fellow
employees disavow such representation. ' 20
Obviously, the Alleluia rationale was a fiction created by the Board to protect
employees whose purpose was the mutual aid and protection of fellow workers,
but whose means had fallen short of the concerted activity requirement set
forth in section 7. The Alleluia reasoning was attacked, and its result over-
turned, in Meyers. In the Meyers case, a truck driver named Prill was involved
in an accident because of defective brakes. z' Prill refused to drive his truck
and requested an inspection by the Tennessee Public Service Commission,
resulting in a citation to the employer. Previously, Prill had voluntarily stopped
at an Ohio roadside inspection station, prompting another citation for defec-
tive equipment.22 The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Prill was
discharged for his safety complaints in Tennessee and Ohio and for his refusal
to drive the truck after the accident in Tennessee. 23 Although Prill had been
alone on both occasions, and although he had not discussed the matter with
other employees, the ALJ relied on Alleluia and found Prill's actions pro-
tected by section 7. 24
The Board, with the three Reagan appointees in the majority, overruled
Alleluia and returned to what it called the 'objective' standard of concerted
activity." 2" The Board criticized Alleluia for dispensing with any "manifesta-
tion of 'group will"' and looking merely to an individual's attempt to enforce
statutes:
The practical effect of this change was to transform concerted activity
into a mirror image of itself. Instead of looking at the observable evidence
of group action to see what men and women in the work place in fact
chose as an issue about which to take some action, it was the Board that
determined the existence of an issue about which employees ought to have
a group concern .... 26
Stressing that concerted activity requires employee interaction, the Board said
that under its new objective standard (which it billed as a return to a
pre-Alleluia analysis), 27 in order to be concerted, activity must be "engaged
in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on
behalf of the employee himself." '28
19. Id. at 1000.
20. Id.
21. Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, (Jan. 6, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025,
1029 (1984).
22. Id.
23. Id., 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030; JD slip op. (No. 730-80) at 8-9 (Jan. 14, 1981).
24. JD slip op. (No. 730-80) at 10-11.
25. Meyers, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028-29.
26. Id. at 1027.
27. Id. at 1029.
28. Id.
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A narrow reading of Meyers might lead one to conclude that the Board
merely discarded its presumption that an employee seeking to enforce statutory
rights acts with the support of other employees. In fact, member Zimmer-
man's dissent tried to so limit the issue.2 9 The Board's opinion, however, had
a much broader effect. Under Alleluia, and even before, the Board had pro-
tected individual activity "for the benefit of" or "on behalf of" other
employees without regard to an employee's attempt to enforce health and
safety legislation. The Meyers decision overruled those cases as well and adopts
a rigid and literal interpretation of section 7.
As the Board noted in Meyers, under Alleluia and its progeny, "the re-
quirement of legislative action" was dropped, and the Board protected, as
concerted activity, individual action that was a matter of "group concern.''30
In Air Surrey Corp.," for example, following the issuance of dishonored
paychecks, a single employee inquired of a bank about his employer's
solvency. 32 The Board found the inquiry was concerted activity and said, echo-
ing Alleluia, there was a "likelihood that the other employees, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary," 33 shared his concern. The Board did make a
weak pass at Alleluia's statutory rationale by noting that a state law pro-
hibited knowing issuance of bad checks.3 ' Air Surrey, however, indicated that
Alleluia rested, not merely on the existence of rights under another statute,
but on an individual's action on a matter of common concern. 35 Any doubt
about that rationale was removed in Steere Dairy, Inc. 36 and Ontario Knife
Co., 37 two cases with similar fact patterns.
In Steere Dairy, three milk deliverymen arrived for work one morning and
discovered their employer had switched from paper to glass containers (thus
making their work more difficult) and had reduced the price of milk. Since
the employees were paid on a percentage basis, the price reduction had a signifi-
cant impact on their compensation.3 8 The employees discussed the matter and
decided that one of them, Watkins, should call management with their con-
29. The dissenting opinion says,
The case before us involves only one of the principles embodied in Alleluia-that
an employee's assertion of an employment-related statutory right can be presumed
to be activity covered by the NLRA. As such it requires no consideration of general
arguments concerning a presumption of concert in the assertion of a matter of
common concern to the work force.
Id. at 1032.
30. Id. at 1027.
31. 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979).
32. The Board found that the employer's paychecks had been dishonored repeatedly, and
that on one occasion, they had been delayed. Id. at 1064.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Board expressly refused to consider whether the complaining employee had engaged
in actual concerted activity (three other employees accompanied him to the bank, but remained
outside), instead premising its decision entirely on the Alleluia rationale. Id.
36. 237 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1978).
37. 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
38. Steere Dairy, 237 N.L.R.B. at 1350-51.
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cerns. Watkins called the president and told him "[T]his is the Steere's drivers
in Oil City, and we are a little upset over the glass jugs." ' 39 Even under the
Meyers test, the action to this point was concerted. The discussions were
employee interaction, and the telephone call was "on the authority of" the
other employees. The problem arose when Watkins, dissatisfied with the presi-
dent's response to the telephone call, walked off the job. Although he tried
to persuade the other two employees to join him, alluding to an assurance
from "labor board representatives" that "they could not be fired," neither
joined the walkout. 0 It was obviously the walkout that prompted Watkins'
discharge. Neither of the other two employees was disciplined for his part
in the telephone complaint lodged by Watkins. Moreover, the ALJ found
that it was Watkins' walkout and his attempt to persuade the other two
employees to join him that prompted the employer's action.4 ' The ALJ might
have held that the walkout fit the definition of concerted activity because
it was merely the outgrowth of what had started as a group protest. Citing
Alleluia, however, the administrative law judge said "even the individual pro-
test of Watkins acting alone was protected because it involved a group
concern-the pay and working conditions of all employees." 2 The ALJ, then,
recognized Watkins' protest as individual action, but protected it under the
constructive concerted activity theory advanced in Alleluia.
In Ontario Knife, two employees complained to management about a work
assignment. The supervisor rebuffed their complaint, in the process directing
an abusive remark at one of the employees, who thereafter walked off the
job in anger. The walkout resulted in her discharge. "3 As in Steere Dairy,
the ALJ conceded that the complaint, having been made by both employees,
was protected concerted activity." He found the walkout, however, to be
unprotected individual conduct."' The Board disagreed, saying that both
employees were engaged in concerted conduct up to the point when one walked
out alone. Citing Steere Dairy, the Board said that the walkout, too, was
concerted (and protected) "because it involved a group concern.""
Although both Steere Dairy and Ontario Knife adopt a portion of the
Alleluia analysis and, perhaps, expand it, 7 the group concern theory was
evident even before 1975. In Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Cooperative,8 the
39. Id. at 1351.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1352.
42. Id. at 1351. The Board adopted the AL's recommended order without comment.
43. Ontario Knife, 247 N.L.R.B. at 1288. The other employee, who did not walk out, was
not discharged.
44. Id. at 1295.
45. Id. at 1298. The ALJ said that there was no case "directly on point." Id. In a footnote
he distinguished Alleluia as involving an attempt "to enforce a statutory right." Id. at 1298 n.23.
46. Id. at 1289.
47. Steere Dairy, in fact, expressly cited Alleluia for support. 237 N.L.R.B. at 1351 n.4.
48. 124 N.L.R.B. 618 (1959), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
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Board found unlawful the discharge of an individual who had complained
about the appointment of a new foreman. As in Steere Dairy, the employees
had complained to each other. Three of them individually complained to
management, without any prior agreement or authorization from co-workers.4 9
The Board upheld an ALJ decision that said it was sufficient for concerted
activity "if the matter at issue is of moment to the group" and if the
spokesman, whether appointed by the group or acting "voluntarily" (i.e.,
presumably acting alone) is speaking "for the benefit of' the interested group."
Similarly, in Oklahoma Allied Telephone Co., 5I decided the year before
Alleluia, the Board found the complaint of one employee to be concerted
activity, affirming an ALJ finding that the employee's actions were not "solely
by or on behalf of herself but were with or on behalf of other employees." 52
There were grumblings from other employees about the same matter, but there
was no finding that the discharged employee acted with the authorization of
the others. In fact, in adopting the AL's opinion, the Board majority noted:
"We do not subscribe the Chairman's view that for Williams' activities to
have been concerted, the protest about them must have been 'authorized' by
her fellow employees, or 'inspired or directed toward inspiring a concerted
plan of action' by fellow employees. ' 5 3 The reference to the "Chairman's
views" relates to then Chairman Miller's dissenting opinion. Miller's comments
proved prophetic:
My colleagues seem to be saying that any time an individual, without
authorization from his fellows, confronts management about a matter which
could be the subject of concerted action, the individual is engaging in section
7 "concerted" activity.14
The following year the Board decided Alleluia. Although that opinion did
not go as far as Miller predicted, subsequent cases significantly expanded the
scope of protection for individual activity. When it overruled Alleluia, the
Board, echoing Miller, said that under that case "the Board questioned whether
the purpose of the activity was one it wished to protect and, if so, it then
deemed the activity 'concerted' without regard to its form." 55
The Board's return to its "pre-Alleluia" standard and its adoption of an
objective test obviously does more than discard the presumption of concerted
activity when an individual claims the protection of safety legislation; it also
overrules those cases that had protected individual employees who, without
49. Id. at 621.
50. Id. at 624.
51. 210 N.L.R.B. 916 (1974).
52. Id. at 920. The discharged employee, Williams, had complained about faulty air condi-
tioning in an area where 16 or 18 employees worked. Id. at 918.
53. Id. at 916 n.l.
54. Id. at 917 (emphasis in the original).
55. Meyers, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027. This was, in fact, the test proposed in an early student
publication. See Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 Co~trM.
L. REV. 514, 522 (1953).
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authorization, voiced a group concern." Its requirement that employees act
together or that a single employee act "on the authority of" others seems
destined to require purposeful interaction or express, knowing authorization.
In short, concert of action will not be established merely because individuals
have lodged protests over similar matters, and authority to act for one's
colleagues will no longer be presumed or implied from the circumstances.
Support for this conclusion can be found not only in the Board's criticism
of Air Surrey, Steere Dairy, and Ontario Knife," but also from other references
used in the opinion and from the facts of Meyers itself.
In the course of its opinion the Board voiced approval of its prior decision
in Traylor-Pamco. 8 In that case, two employees refused to eat lunch in a
sewer tunnel, opting instead for the more sanitary conditions of the "dry
shack." 5 9 The majority in Meyers endorsed the AL's conclusion that the
activity was not concerted because neither employee had consulted the other
and neither had relied on the other in his action.6" The facts of Traylor-Pamco,
however, furnish evidence of the strictness of the Meyers standard. It is true
that only two of the employees of the first shift regularly ate in the dry shack.
However, only one week before his discharge, one of the employees (Cordisco),
as union steward, ordered all of the employees to eat in the dry shack because
56. In addition to the cases cited in the text, see, e.g., Dupont Puerto Rico, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B.
1003 (1982) (employee's inquiry to management concerning fellow employee's wages was pro-
tected concerted activity); Scooba Mfg. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 147 (1981), enforcement denied, 694
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984) (employee's discussion with vice-
president concerning discharge of son was protected concerted activity); Pioneer Natural Gas
Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 17 (1980), enforcement denied, 662 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (employee's
activity in telling other employee about fellow employee's racial remarks was concerted because
related to a matter of common concern); Koch Supplies, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1980),
enforcement denied, 646 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (employee's protest concerning promise of
vacation benefits a matter of common concern). See also Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228
N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977); St. Joseph's High School, 236 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1978), vacated on other
grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901 (1980).
For the General Counsel's interpretation of Meyers, see [NLRB Office of the General Counsel
Memorandum GC 84-3, reprinted in 115 LAB. RiEL. REP. (BNA) 284 (Apr. 9, 1984).
57. The Board in Meyers included each of these three cases in a footnote to text that said:
Alleluia's progeny, however, dropped even the requirement of legislative action,
and the Board ultimately decided what ought to be the subject matter of working
persons' concern when the statutory manifestation of such "group concern" was
slim or nonexistent.
115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
58. 154 N.L.R.B. 380 (1965).
59. Id. at 385.
60. In Meyers, the Board quoted a portion of the administrative law judge's opinion from
Traylor-Pamco:
There is not even the proverbial iota of evidence that there was any consultation
between the two in the matter, that either relied in any measure on the others in
making his refusal, or that their association in refusing to eat in the tunnel was
anything but accidental.
154 N.L.R.B. at 388, quoted in Meyers, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026. Referring to the facts in Meyers,
the Board said: "As with the employees who ate their lunch together in Traylor-Pamco, there
is no evidence here that there was any concerted plan of action ... ." 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
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he thought eating in the tunnel violated the collective bargaining agreement. 6'
The following day, all employees on first shift delayed the beginning of work
because of the same dispute. Management officials assured Cordisco that the
matter was being explored with the union.62 The employees then began work,
although Cordisco would not eat in the sewer and, at lunch time, he and
one other employee went to the dry shack. 63 Thus, the ALJ, with Board con-
currence, refused to find concert of action, even though two employees had
taken exactly the same action at the same time, against a background of a
union protest, a mass refusal to begin work, and concurrent union negotia-
tions over the matter that prompted the employee action.
Similar facts existed in Meyers itself. Although Prill (the discharged
employee) was ordinarily assigned to the defective truck, another employee,
Gove, drove it for two weeks during Prill's absence. When Prill returned,
he was present when Gove complained to management about the truck's
condition and heard him say "I wasn't going to drive it no farther." 64 Despite
the fact that Prill's subsequent activity related to problems with the same truck,
the Board characterized it as an individual protest. The Board said there was
no evidence that Prill and Gove had "joined forces." Rather, each had acted
on his own: "Taken by itself.., individual employee concern, even if openly
manifested by several employees on an individual basis, is not sufficient
evidence to prove concert of action."' '
Both the Board's endorsement of Traylor-Pamco and its characterization
of the facts in Meyers demonstrate the harshness of its new standard. With
the exception of individual activity in support of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the theory of constructive concerted activity is dead. Meyers expressly
rejected the presumption that an employee invoking statutory protection acted
for the group and, likewise, repudiated the presumption that an individual's
conduct is concerted when he acts "on behalf of" the group or with respect
to a "matter of concern" to the group. But it did more than that-it created
a more stringent standard to invoke the protection of the statute when the
matter at issue is not merely presumed to be of group interest, but is, in fact,
a group concern.
2. The Courts of Appeals
The rigid objective test promulgated in Meyers finds considerable support
in the courts of appeals, thus making it probable that the Meyers rationale
61. Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. at 385.
62. Id. In fact, negotiations with the union were ongoing at the time of the discharge and
subsequently produced an agreement. Id. at 388 and at 388 n.8.
63. Id. at 385-86.
64. Meyers, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
65. Id. at 1030 (emphasis in the original). The Board's decision not only overrules Alleluia,
but stands in contrast to Guernsey-Muskingum, discussed supra text accompanying notes 48-50,
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will survive at least as long as the Reagan influence on the Board is dominant. 6
Given the pattern of decisions among the various courts of appeals, it seems
doubtful that any of them will prompt the Board to reevaluate its position.
Moreover, while frustrated employees can certainly apply for Supreme Court
review, the uniformity of views expressed by the courts of appeals makes
Supreme Court action unlikely.
Although a few courts of appeals had given limited endorsement to the
theory of constructive concerted activity when an individual sought to enforce
a collective bargaining agreement 67 (an interpretation now approved by the
Supreme Court in City Disposal), most had not,"' and all had rejected Alleluia
and its progeny." The only consistent exceptions for individual, as opposed
to group, conduct involved activity that looked to or sought to incite group
action70 and situations in which one employee had been authorized to act on
behalf of others.7 ' Even though the courts of appeals unanimously agree that
actual concerted action is essential to claim the protection of section 7, they
where three employees complained individually, but were nonetheless found to be involved in
concerted activity.
66. As of this writing, three of the four members on the Board (Chairman Dotson and Members
Hunter and Dennis) were appointed by President Reagan. They formed the majority in Meyers.
Member Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter, dissented. One seat on the Board is vacant.
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (protecting
as concerted activity an individual's attempt to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, popularly
known as the "Interboro doctrine"); NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam). See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976), in which
the court enforced, without opinion, an NLRB decision (217 N.L.R.B. 278 (1975)) premised
on Interboro. But see Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980),
where the Court said that the lack of a collective bargaining agreement in the case made it "un-
necessary ... to determine whether Interboro is to be applied in this circuit .. " Id. at 309.
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973); ARO,
Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1973); Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980); Pelton Casteel,
Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1980); Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th
Cir. 1980); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); Ontario
Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d
1079 (8th Cir. 1977). Even before Alleluia, courts of appeals had insisted on actual, as opposed
to constructive, concerted activity. See, e.g., Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1967); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
70. See, e.g., Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967), where the court
stated that, "in order to prove a concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act, it is necessary
to demonstrate that the activity was for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action
to correct a grievance or a complaint." Id. at 276. See also Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.
v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1969): "The activity of a single employee in enlisting the
support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much 'concerted activity'
as is ordinary group activity." Id. at 1365.
71. See, e.g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); Hugh H. Wilson Corp.
v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348, 1355 (3d Cir. 1969); Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
310 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). The requirement that an employee act with "or on the authori-
ty of" other employees has been adopted as the objective test in Meyers. Meyers Industries,
268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1029 (1984).
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have seldom addressed the policy implications of their decisions. Instead, they
have been content with the obvious omission of individual conduct from the
protected activities enumerated in section 7. Since the courts of appeals' views
have been detailed elsewhere,"2 a few examples are sufficient to illustrate the
range of opinion.
In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 73 the Fourth Circuit refused
to enforce a Board finding, under an Alleluia statutory enforcement theory,
that an employer violated section 8(a)(1) when it discharged an employee for
filing numerous spurious workmen's compensation claims. The court started
its analysis by noting that "concerted activity," if interpreted literally "would
appear to require more than a single participant."" The court rejected the
Alleluia rationale as imposing "an irrebuttable presumption" of concert.15
Instead, the court embraced the test promulgated by the Third Circuit in its
opinion in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB:7
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity
although it involved only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such,
it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object
of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some
relation to group action in the interest of the employees.17
In neither Krispy Kreme nor Mushroom Transportation, however, did the
courts discuss the policy reasons for their literal construction of the statute.
That is, both opinions start with the assumption that the statute, read literally,
protects only activity undertaken by at least two employees. 78 Neither examined
whether protection of individual conduct could advance the policy of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. In fact, Krispy Kreme characterized the existence
of actual concert as a "jurisdictional requirement" for Board action. 79
In its review of the Board's decision in Ontario Knife,8" the Second Circuit
made a cursory attempt at explaining its insistence that activity must be literally
concerted in order to be protected, a requirement it found lacking in the case
before it. The court briefly reviewed the origin of the concerted activity
72. For an excellent, and detailed, discussion of judicial action in concerted activity cases,
see Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 310-28.
73. 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 306.
75. Id. at 309. The court noted the Board's argument that the Alleluia presumption (i.e.,
that employees are presumed to support action taken in the common interest, absent employer
evidence to the contrary) "had the effect of merely shifting the burden of proof." Id. The court
said that the Board had conceded in its brief that it had never "suggested 'the precise manner
whereby an employer might obtain evidence to rebut the presumption.' " Id.
76. 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
77. Id. at 685.
78. Both opinions concede that individuals acting as such enjoy some protection, but only
when their conduct was for the purpose of inducing group action. See Krispy Kreme, 635 F.2d
at 307; Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685.
79. Krispy Kreme, 635 F.2d at 310.
80. Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
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language in section 7 and concluded that "courts should adhere rather closely
to the statutory language." 8' Apparently its conclusion is premised on its
finding that, in drafting the concerted activity language, "Congress scarcely
had .. . in mind" the protection available to individual employees.82 This
conclusion, of course, fails to address Gorman and Finkin's argument that
Congress was only interested in expanding the rights of employees. Stated
differently, Congress might not have had the interests of individuals "in mind"
because there was no significant question concerning their rights.
The rigidity with which courts have insisted on actual concerted conduct
is demonstrated not only by Ontario Knife, where the court might easily have
found the single employee's walkout resulting from a group concern to be
concerted, but also by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Indiana Gear Works
v. NLRB. 83 There, an employee (Packard), upset with the meagerness of a
general wage increase, ridiculed the company's action (and its president) by
posting cartoons found by the ALJ to be "insulting, sarcastic and malicious.""'
There was evidence that at least two other employees had suggested captions
for Packard's cartoons, that at least one other employee had posted a similar
cartoon, and that such cartoon posting was a common form of communica-
tion among the employees.85 Although the court might have found the activity
concerted but unprotected,", it chose to characterize the protest as mere in-
dividual conduct. The court noted the lack of any evidence that "Packard
had prepared and posted the cartoons for the purpose of inducing or preparing
for any group action by the employees. ' 81 Inexplicably, the court simply
dismissed the "casual assistance" offered by the other employees by saying
81. Id. at 843.
82. The court noted that the concerted activity language of section 7 came from section 2
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)-legislation intended "to curtail injunc-
tions . . .against what everyone would recognize as organized activity." Ontario Knife, 637
F.2d at 843.
83. 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967).
84. Id. at 275.
85. In its opinion the NLRB stated:
While the evidence shows that Packard was perhaps the leading spirit in the prepara-
tion and posting of the cartoons, the evidence also establishes that the cartoons
did not represent a single individual's effort, that Packard was not the only employee
so engaged, that a number of the employees in the gear department suggested cap-
tions for the cartoons and offered Packard other newspaper pictures with captions,
and that other employees hung similar cartoons on the lampshade.
Indiana Gear Works, 156 N.L.R.B. 397, 398 (1965). The Board also found that cartoon posting
"was not an uncommon form of communication among the employees," id., and that the employer
was aware of the practice. Id. at 398 n.2.
The court referred to the assistance and the practice only briefly. Indiana Gear Works, 371
F.2d at 276.
86. Although section 7 protects employees who engage in concerted activity, not all such
conduct enjoys the protection of the law. See generally, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTrVE BARGAINING 302-25 (1976). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 161-65.
87. Indiana Gear Works, 371 F.2d at 276.
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that "by no stretch of interpretation [can it] be held to be concerted activity
under the Act." 8 One's imagination should not have to stretch far to con-
clude that the employees who offered assistance to Packard were acting in
concert with him.
Gorman and Finkin correctly assert that on numerous occasions the courts
of appeals have failed to articulate any policy arguments for protecting group
as opposed to individual conduct, but have been satisfied with a dictionary
definition of "concerted." As is discussed later,89 however, the courts' fail-
ings do not mean that the history of the Act is devoid of policy supporting
the focus on collective activity. Collective bargaining was the means adopted
by Congress to loosen the employer's stranglehold on the lives of employees.
Not only collective bargaining, but activity likely to lead to that end is also
protected. There is no warrant for expanding the statutory language to embrace
individual conduct unrelated to the welfare of the group as Gorman and Finkin
have proposed. The Board and the courts, however, also subvert the Act's
policy by focusing narrowly on the number of employees involved in a pro-
test instead of on the movement it represents.
B. The Supreme Court Case
The part of the constructive concerted activity theory reserved by the Board
in Meyers was resolved by the Supreme Court in City Disposal. Interestingly,
the two cases are quite close factually, with only one significant, although
determinative, difference. As in Meyers, the employee whose rights were at
issue in City Disposal (Brown) was a truck driver. Also, as in Meyers, Brown's
discharge resulted from his refusal to drive a truck that he believed had defec-
tive brakes.' 0 Unlike the employee in Meyers, however, Brown and his
co-workers were represented by a union that had negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement with Brown's employer. One provision of that contract
said that the employer was not to require employees to drive unsafe vehicles
and that employees who refused to operate such equipment committed no
contract violation "unless such refusal is unjustified." 9' The Court accepted
88. Id. at 277. In light of the Board findings reported supra note 85, the court's characteriza-
tion of the concerted activity as "casual" appears indefensible. In addition, the Board referred
to testimony of other employees detailing their action in either posting cartoons or lending assistance
to Packard. Indiana Gear Works, 156 N.L.R.B. at 398 nn.3-4.
89. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
90. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1507 (1984).
91. The clause in question was contained in a contract between the employer and Local 247
of the Teamsters Union:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways
any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appliances
prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees
refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
Id. at 1507-08. Similar language has been at issue in other concerted activity cases. See, e.g.,
Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (refusal to drive truck not concerted).
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the NLRB's conclusion that Brown "honestly and reasonably believed" that
the truck was unsafe.92 Despite that belief, the union declined to process
Brown's contractual grievance, finding that it had "no objective merit. ' 9 3
Brown then took his case to the NLRB, which adopted the AL's finding
that Brown's conduct was protected concerted activity and that his discharge
on account of his protest, therefore, violated section 8(a)(1).9 "
The AL's conclusion was based on the so-called Interboro doctrine, named
after the Second Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.
9 5
As the Court noted in City Disposal, the Board has used two theories to justify
its conclusion that an employee who invokes rights under a collective bargaining
agreement is engaged in concerted activity: (1) that the employee's action is
an extension of the concerted activity that gave rise to the labor contract;
and (2) that the employee's action affects the rights of, and is in the interest
of, all the employees in the bargaining unit.9 6
Because of the Board's rules for the establishment of bargaining units, the
similarity between the second justification for Interboro and the line of cases
overruled in Meyers is clear. Under those cases, the Board's theory had been
that an employee's activity is concerted if it is in the interest of other,
presumably similarly situated, employees. The employee's action in an Inter-
boro case also redounds to the benefit of similarly situated employees since
unit determination rules require a finding that employees within a bargaining
unit share a community of interest. 7 The distinction would appear to be that
in the Alleluia line of cases, the employee acted on matters that could only
be presumed to be of interest to the other employees, while in Interboro the
agreement itself made the presumption irrebuttable. That is, the agreement
furnished evidence that all employees in the unit shared the same concern.98
92. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1507.
93. Id. at 1509.
94. City Disposal Systems, 256 N.L.R.B. 451 (1981). The court of appeals denied enforce-
ment of the NLRB's order, finding that Brown's refusal to drive the truck was an action taken
solely on his own behalf and thus was not a concerted activity within the meaning of section
7. 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
95. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), enforcing 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966).
96. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1510.
97. An analysis of NLRB unit determination procedures is beyond the scope of this article.
Briefly, section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), provides that the representative
selected by employees "in a unit appropriate for [collective bargaining]" is the exclusive represen-
tative. Section 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), provides, in part:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof...
The Board has developed unit determination criteria to fulfill this statutory change, aimed prin-
cipally at insuring a community of interest, or cohesiveness, among the unit. For a fuller discus-
sion, see generally, R. GomAN, supra note 86, at 66-92.
98. The strength of this analysis is undermined somewhat, however, by NLRB decisions say-
ing that even meritless contractual claims are concerted activity entitled to the protection of sec-
tion 7. See, e.g., T & T Indus., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517 (1978). The rationale would appear
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Although the Supreme Court alluded to the Board's dual justification for
the Interboro doctrine, it based its affirmance of the doctrine primarily on
the extension of concerted activity theory. The Court started by stating the
obvious: concerted activity encompasses the "activities of employees who have
joined together in order to achieve common goals." 99 It acknowledged,
however, that the question before it was the "precise manner" in which
individual employee action "must be linked to the actions of fellow employees"
in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of concerted activity. 100 The Court
observed that even section 7 did not require a literal, or dictionary, definition
of "concerted." Thus, joining or assisting a labor organization is concerted
activity within the statute, even though a single employee can engage in that
conduct.' Moreover, most courts of appeals have acknowledged that some
type of individual conduct is protected by section 7. The problem, then, was
simply one of "differing views regarding the nature of the relationship that
must exist between the action of the individual employee and the action of
the group."'0 2 In Interboro, the group action was the negotiation of the
contract which the employee, through individual action, tried to implement.
Since an employee could not invoke a contractual right without the concerted
activity of the contract negotiation, the Court viewed an individual's claim
based on the contract as "an integral part of the process that gave rise to
the agreement."'0 13 An employee, then, who invokes a contractual right "does
not stand alone," but, through his assertion, reminds the employer that col-
lective action "had extracted a promise" from the employer and, if need be,
the individual could "reharness the power of the group" to ensure
enforcement.0 4 Treating the individual complaint as a symbolic "reassembling"
of the group, Justice Brennan said the employee's action was concerted "in
a very real sense."'0 5 Presumably, the "very real sense" distinguishes the
Interboro doctrine from constructive concerted activity cases like Alleluia where
a common employee interest was not "real" but was merely inferred.
Although the Court did no go as far as Gorman and Finkin had urged,
it did rely on their view of the history of section 7, and of the Act generally,
to conclude that protection of individual conduct in the Interboro situation
was consistent with the policies of the Act. 6 What Congress sought, said
to be that other employees support efforts to enforce the collective agreement, even though they
may not agree with the claim being asserted.
99. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1511-12.
106. Id. at 1513. The Court cited Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, for the origin of the word
"concert" in labor legislation. It traced the term from section 20 of the 1914 Clayton Act (29
U.S.C. § 52 (1982)), through section 4 of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. § 104),
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the Court, was to equalize the bargaining power between employers and
employees by expressly protecting concerted action of the employees. Since
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement is an integral part of the
collective bargaining process, protecting individual employees who invoke
contractual rights "mitigates that inequality ... and is, therefore, fully con-
sistent with congressional intent."'' 7
In an apparent stab at the Board's other justification for Interboro-that
individual enforcement benefits the other employees in the unit-the Court
noted that protecting the individual "preserves the integrity of the entire
collective bargaining process" since the individual employee makes a contrac-
tually based right a "reality" and thereby "breathes life" not only into the
agreement, but into the entire collective bargaining process.' 8 Employee
Brown's refusal to drive a garbage truck, then, not only protected his own
well-being, but simultaneously resuscitated the entire system of collective
bargaining.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF CONCERTED ACTVITY
The article by Gorman and Finkin and the recent opinions of the NLRB
and the Supreme Court are representative of the spectrum of opinion on
concerted activity. At the one extreme is Meyers, which adopts a rigid group
activity requirement in order to claim statutory protection; at the other extreme
is Gorman and Finkin who would protect individual activity taken for in-
dividual goals. Somewhere in the middle is City Disposal which adopts at
least part of the Board-created fiction of constructive concerted activity. None
of these positions is a justifiable reading of the statute. The Meyers opinion
is much too narrow, Gorman and Finkin's interpretation ignores the over-
riding purpose of the NLRA, and the City Disposal opinion is an unwar-
ranted attempt to interpose the NLRB as an agency of contract enforcement.
A better reading of the statute would liberally construe the "concerted activity"
terminology of section 7, but would protect individual employee conduct on-
ly when related to the actual concerns of a group. Individual activity for in-
dividual purposes should not be protected. Nor should individual activity that
seeks to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement be protected
unless the enforcement effort uses the contractual procedure. Although the
Board's opinion in Meyers marks a radical departure from its previous cases,
some of those cases (albeit not Alleluia) represented an interpretation more
in line with the purposes and policies of the NLRA than the views espoused
by Gorman and Finkin, Meyers, or City Disposal. A more detailed analysis
of each interpretation will aptly demonstrate the point.
and section 7 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (ch. 90, § 7, 48 Stat. 195, 196),
and finally, into section 7 of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 157).
107. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1513.
108. Id.
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A. Gorman and Finkin's Interpretation
1. Historical and Statutory Arguments
Gorman and Finkin's thesis that section 7 protects individual activity for
individual purposes as well as concerted activity for mutual purposes is
premised on both an historical analysis of the origin of the phrase "concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection" and a review of the social and political
framework from which it came. The concerted activity language first appeared
in the policy statement of the Norris-LaGuardia Act-legislation that did not
affirmatively protect employee efforts to organize and bargain collectively,
but that did prohibit the federal courts from enjoining those activities.' °9 Subse-
quently, the language was carried over into section 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act"' and was ultimately adopted as a protected right
in section 7 of the 1935 Wagner Act."' In reviewing the gestation of the
109. The article by Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, contains an excellent discussion of the
history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, including the decision to limit its focus to procedural, not
substantive, reform. Id. at 332-337. The Act limits the ability of the federal court to issue injunc-
tions in labor disputes. Section 1 (29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)) provides, in part:
No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or . . . injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
The legislation was necessary to stop federal courts from interfering with employee organiza-
tional efforts by enjoining strikes and other union activity. See, e.g., H. MM & R. MorGoMRy,
ORGANIZED LABOR 629-51 (1945) and F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, Tim LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
Although the focus of the Act is procedural, the policy statement in section 2 (U.S.C. 29
§ 102) broadly endorses the right of employees to engage" in collective activity:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of govern-
mental authority for owners of property to organize the corporate and other forms
of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless
to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby
to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he
should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment,
and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of and
limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States
are enacted. (emphasis added).
In addition, section 4 (29 U.S.C. § 104) lists the specific acts that may not be enjoined whether
engaged in "singly or in concert." See also section 5 (29 U.S.C. § 105).
110. Ch. 90, § 7, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933). The legislation required industries to adopt codes
of fair competition and required, in section 7(a), that the codes immunize employees from employer
coercion in self-organization "or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection." The quoted language was taken verbatim from section 2
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102. The National Industrial Recovery Act was found
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
111. See supra note 2.
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concerted activity language, Gorman and Finkin note that under Norris-
LaGuardia, Congress simply extended to groups, rights of action already
enjoyed by individuals.1 2 They then argue that the NLRA was intended to
protect from private sanction the same activity that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
protected against governmental sanction. Moreover, even though the NLRA
focuses principally on collective bargaining, "there is not the slightest hint
in the history of the NLRA that in attempting to expand the protection that
the law would give to group activity to secure benefits or improvements,
Congress contemplated a less favored status for individual activity having the
same objective." ' 13 In addition, Gorman and Finkin buttressed their conclu-
sion by arguing that the NLRA was intended to foster "industrial democracy,"
a key feature of which was securing to the individual employee the right to
present grievances to his employer. The purpose of the Act, then, was not
merely to foster collective bargaining, but "to ensure the liberty and dignity
of the individual working person.''14
Gorman and Finkin's use of labor and political history is impressive and
their policy arguments seem compelling. Congress might well have chosen to
temper the disparity in bargaining power between employer and employee by
securing rights for individuals to act in their own behalf. The question is
whether that was, in fact, the path chosen in the NLRA. Granted, the mere
words of a statute do not always reveal congressional intent. Nonetheless,
the fact that a convincing argument can be advanced in favor of broadening
statutory coverage does not compel the conclusion that that is what Congress
has done.115 Congress might have legislated protection for the individual
employee. But it might also have decided that equalization of bargaining power
could better be effected by protecting only that group activity explicitly
mentioned in the statute.
112. "The assumption of the Act was not that action which should be protected when engaged
in by a group should be left unprotected when engaged in by the individual, but that lawful
individual action should not become unlawful when engaged in collectively." Gorman & Finkin,
supra note 4, at 336 (emphasis in the original).
113. Id. at 338.
114. Id. at 344. After viewing the political and social history of the time, id. at 338-46, Gorman
and Finkin conclude:
[T]he history of the language of section 7 and an examination of the policy it was
designed to effect suggest a far more expansive reading [than the literal interpreta-
tion of the courts and the Board]-one that encompasses the individual's right to
complain and to act in his own self-interest.
Id. at 344.
115. Whether we search for actual legislative purpose or actual legislative intent, we
can infer it only from external materials.
• . . Because the reliable indicia of any purpose are more likely to be found
beyond the mere words of the statute, the temptation to scavenge among the materials
of legislative history is at least as great as it is for legislative intent.
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATuTEs 92 (1975). The same author
includes a caution that seems appropriate in this area:
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The legislative history marshalled by Gorman and Finkin does indicate an
intention to remove the disparity in bargaining power between the employer
and the employee, but it does not necessarily justify the conclusion that
individual conduct for individual purposes was to be protected. As noted,
Gorman and Finkin argue that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to
legalize, for groups, activity that was already lawful for individuals. In short,
they argue that the focus of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and, later, of the NLRA,
was only on group activity because there was no serious question about the
right of individual workers to act in their own behalf. That conclusion seems
appropriate for the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Before 1932, individual protests
were lawful in the sense of not being criminal or subject to court injunction."16
The legislation extended that immunity to group conduct. Clearly, it was not
necessary for Norris-LaGuardia to address individual activity since the rights
of individuals were not in question.
That argument, however, cannot simply be reapplied in conclusory fashion
to the NLRA, where the focus was much different. It may have been
unnecessary for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to expressly legalize individual
conduct already recognized as "lawful," but the issue under the NLRA is
whether an individual's conduct is protected, not whether it is "lawful.",1 7
Confronted with a common law that allowed employers to retaliate freely
against employees for virtually any reason (or for no reason at all)," 8 Congress
As with legislative intent, the danger in presuming an actual legislative purpose
beyond what is expressly or impliedly revealed is that the interpreter will either
attribute to the statute a purpose of his own contriving or search for actual purpose
so relentlessly that he goes beyond the limits of the appropriate available evidence.
Id.
116. The focus in injunction cases was concerted activity that might lead to unionization. The
injunctions were ordinarily issued under tort law theories. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). The same activities by individuals were, however, as one
commentator has said, "perfectly lawful." R. Gom1AN, supra note 86, at 2.
117. Although section 7 protects concerted activity, some lawful activity that clearly meets
any definition of "concerted" is, nonetheless, not protected. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229,
IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). See also infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
118. Detailed discussion of the so-called "employment-at-will" doctrine is beyond the scope
of this article. In brief, the doctrine allows employers to discharge employees "for a good reason,
a poor reason or no reason at all" absent a contract or some statutory prohibition (like the
NLRA's prohibition of discharge in retaliation for concerted activity). See, e.g., Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1943). Traditionally, judicial interpretation of
the doctrine has been harsh. For example, one court held that a contract guaranteeing "permanent
employment" created only an "at-will" relationship. See Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36
Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
The employment-at-will doctrine has provided an enormous literature of late, and there is
some reason to suspect some erosion of its traditional application. See, e.g., 16 U. MicE. J.
L. REF. (Winter 1983) (entire issue); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
Any loosening of the at-will doctrine, however, has been accomplished under state law theories.
The NLRA does not require that employers have proper cause for discharge or discipline. It
merely protects employees from employer retaliation for union or other concerted activity. See
Edvard G. Budd Mfg. 138 F.2d at 91.
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explicitly protected certain forms of group, as opposed to individual, con-
duct. Unlike the Norris-LaGuardia Act, where individual rights were not at
issue and which dealt only with group rights, any protection against employer
retaliation was at issue in 1935, and if protection for individuals exists, it
must spring from the NLRA itself. Individual employees had the "right" to
complain to their employers prior to the NLRA. No provision of the law
made such action illegal. Nor was it illegal, however, for the employers to
retaliate for the complaint. Individual action was immunized against govern-
mental sanction, but not against private retribution. In passing the NLRA,
Congress for the first time created rights against private employers by protect-
ing concerted activity for "mutual aid or protection" from retaliation. The
inference is strong that only the conduct expressly mentioned enjoyed that
new protection. Neither the wording of the statute nor the legislative history
discloses a congressional intention to protect individual conduct for individual
gain. 119
The statute and the legislative history do disclose an intention to equalize
bargaining power between employer and employee. 2° The enhancement of
119. The legislative history of the Act does not reveal an intention to protect individual as
well as group activity. See NLRB, LEOISIATvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT, 1935 (1949) [hereinafter cited as NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Although Gorman and Finkin
cite testimony supporting the principle of industrial democracy, see, e.g., Gorman & Finkin,
supra note 4, at 343, neither the language used by Congress, nor the congressional reports support
the argument that section 7 protects individual conduct for individual gain. To the contrary,
the reports stress collective bargaining. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra, at 2301: "It is thus believed feasible to remove
the provocation to a large proportion of the bitterest industrial outbreaks by giving definite legal
status to the procedure of collective bargaining .... " See also id. at 8: "These sections [7 and
8] are designed to establish and protect the basic rights incidental to the practice of collective
bargaining." See also H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935), reprinted in NLRA
LEGISLATvE HISTORY, supra at 3065: "IT]he bill seeks to redress an inequality of bargaining
powers by forbidding employers to interfere with the development of employee organization,
thereby removing one of the issues most provocative of industrial strife and bringing about a
general acceptance of the orderly procedure of collective bargaining.
8565 Indiana Law Journal 59-4 mc 2/28/85 galley 66A
120. Section 1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), provides in part:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife. ...
Experience has proved that protection by the law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . ...
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
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the status and position of the individual worker was no doubt part of that
goal. That does not mean, however, that Congress chose to accomplish the
goal by protecting employees who strike out on their own, seeking to serve
only their own ends. Despite Gorman and Finkin's suggestion to the contrary,
there is nothing anomalous about securing individual liberty through group
action. The focus of the National Labor Relations Act is collective
bargaining,' 2' although, as NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.'2 teaches,
other forms of group activity are protected as well. 2 3 Congress might well
have decided that given the great disparity between employer and employee
power, the status of individuals could be enhanced only through the force
of the group. Collective bargaining itself represents an instance when some
individual interests and freedoms are sacrificed for group concerns. However,
the group is made up of individuals. Concessions which group power extracts
from the employer inure to individual employees.'" By protecting only
concerted activity, Congress may well have decided that only by group action
could the plight of working people be improved. Individual employees acting
solely in their own interest were not likely to secure concessions from employers
or otherwise nullify the employer's significant bargaining advantage.
2. An Anomaly?
In addition to their historical and statutory arguments, much of Gorman
and Finkin's thesis is premised on the "extraordinary anomaly" of protect-
ing two employees who refuse to work or otherwise protest employer action
while leaving exposed a single employee who takes exactly the same action
on his own behalf.' 2 Gorman and Finkin argue that the focus on the number
of employees involved in a protest, or on the number who would be benefitted
by it, creates an artificial distinction between protected and unprotected con-
duct and "trivializes the significant public policy underlying statutory
protection." 2 6
The word "some" modifying "employer" was added by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947,
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. Otherwise, all the quoted material was enacted in 1935. See sources quoted
supra note 119 for the legislative material.
121. See sources cited supra notes 119-20.
122. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
123. In Washington Aluminum, the Supreme court held a walkout by nonunion employees
to protest working conditions (cold temperatures in the workplace) to be protected concerted
activity. Id. at 17.
124. Under the principle of exclusive representation created by section 9(a) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), the union has the power to bind all employees in the bargaining
unit to the collective agreement negotiated with the employer. Stated differently, employees are
entitled to the benefits negotiated through the strength of the group, whether or not they belong
to the union. See J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
125. Gorman and Finkin, supra note 4, at 329. The authors also refer to the anomaly in other
parts of the article. See, e.g., id. at 345 n.220, 347, 348, and 357.
126. Id. at 348.
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. On the surface, that argument seems convincing. Why, indeed, would
Congress ignore an individual protest made in one's own self-interest, yet pro-
tect it if but one more employee will join in? Although this question may
point out a significant gap in the statute's coverage, it does not compel the
conclusion that individual, as opposed to group, conduct is protected by sec-
tion 7.
As noted above, the focus of the NLRA is collective bargaining. While
it also protects other group activity undertaken "for mutual aid or protec-
tion," it seems clear that Congress perceived collective bargaining as the prin-
cipal means of achieving democracy within the workplace. The real anomaly,
then, is not failing to protect individuals who act solely in their own interests,
but is using legislation devoted almost entirely to the advancement of collec-
tive bargaining to protect selfish, individual conduct which could, in fact,
lead to the destruction of the group. Gorman and Finkin's constant focus
on the rights of two employees over those of an individual displays the obvious
weakness of a statute that protects only group activity. Yet, that persistent
focus distorts the concept of concerted activity. The hope held out by the
NLRA is not that two or three employees will lodge feeble protests against
their employers. While that conduct would be protected, it is unlikely to provide
significant employee power or to hold out any realistic prospect of
improvements in working conditions. Rather, the hope held forth by the NLRA
is that the majority of employees will combine their forces to meet the employer
on a more equal footing. Only that kind of group activity offers any real
likelihood of change. Two or three employees acting together are protected,
not only because such conduct is "concerted," but more importantly, because
the protest of a handful-representing at least the concerns of that small
group-might grow in numbers and strength. For the same reason, as is
developed later, 27 the protest of even a single employee over a matter of
common employee concern deserves the protection of the Act. But the isolated
grumblings of an individual employee, divorced from the concern of his
co-workers, offer little opportunity for group action and fall outside the pro-
tection of the Act.1 28
127. See infra notes 131-155 and accompanying text.
128. Gorman and Finkin also argue that such anomalies distort the focus of the Act, which
they say "is to ensure the liberty and dignity of the individual working person," and that "at
the core of the freedom of the individual to protest in a group necessarily lies the freedom of
the individual to protest at all." Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 344. As noted, however,
the "liberty and dignity" of individuals promised by the Act is to be achieved through the power
of collective action. Moreover, while individuals should have the right to complain about matters
of group concerns, selfish individual protests are themselves anomalous under legislation designed
to enhance collective strength.
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B. Meyers Industries
1. The Problem With the "Objective" Theory
Although Gorman and Finkin's charitable interpretation of section 7 seems
unwarranted under the policy of the NLRA, it is far less troubling than the
"objective" theory promulgated in Meyers. That is not to say that the rationale
of Alleluia was supportable. However, Meyers is an overreaction to the prob-
lems created by that case.
Several responses to the fiction of constructive concerted activity were
possible. The Board could have retained the theory or it could have discarded
the concerted means test altogether, a path that Alleluia itself treaded perilous-
ly. As a practical matter, it seemed unlikely that the Board, and particularly
the courts of appeals, would discard thirty-nine years of decisions that diligently
(though not always righteously) maintained the distinction. Moreover, despite
Gorman and Finkin's efforts, neither the statute nor its history supports such
a move. The response actually adopted by the Board not only overrules Alleluia
and discards the theory of constructive concerted activity (except as preserved
in City Disposal), but also renders unlikely the protection of any individual
conduct.
The problem with Meyers is, in some sense, the same as the problem with
Gorman and Finkin's interpretation: each pushes too far. Thus, at one extreme,
Gorman and Finkin would protect individual conduct even for selfish, in-
dividual purposes; at the other extreme, Meyers ignores individual protests,
even if made concerning a matter of group concern. Certainly, Alleluia and
its progeny had overstepped the bounds of the statute. The vice of Alleluia
was not the Board's attempt to protect individual employees, but its position
that an individual's claim based on a statute (and later a claim based on a
matter of common concern) was presumptively concerted activity. There is
a grain of truth in the Board's recent declaration that, under Alleluia, the
Board protected activity that it thought ought to have been a group concern
simply because "the purpose of the activity was one it wished to protect."' 29
Although a concerted means test should not be applied so rigidly as to ignore
all individual activity, individual action taken without any indication of support
from other employees, or even interest among other employees, is simply not
"concerted." More important than the definition of concerted, however, is
that such individual conduct taken solely for individual gain cannot lay claim
to any protection under the policy of the Act.
As noted earlier, the Act fosters collective bargaining as the principal means
of achieving industrial equality. Other group activity deserves protection prin-
129. Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1027
(1984).
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cipally because it might yield an employee effort of sufficient force to either
compel collective bargaining or some other effective concerted employee
action.'30 Individual conduct solely for individual gain is unlikely to result
in any significant threat to employer dominance of the workplace. Even though
Alleluia's presumption of group support was flawed, however, that does not
mean that its legacy should be rejected completely
2. The Better Interpretation
The concerted activity language in section 7 should not be read so rigidly
as to impose an actual numbers requirement. Congress chose to protect
concerted activity, not as a way of singling out individual employees for
discrimination, but in order to nurture collective bargaining. Both group ac-
tivity and individual conduct that either solidifies a group or is likely to lead
to group activity should be eligible for protection. The crucial inquiry, then,
ought not to be merely the number of employees who act; on that point,
Gorman and Finkin are surely correct. Instead, the focus should be the
likelihood that the action taken represents a group concern. It is one thing
to hold that an individual's complaint on his own behalf falls outside the
protection of the Act; it is quite another to reach the same conclusion when
the individual's protest is lodged against a background of similar complaints
by other employees. Yet the Board's single-minded emphasis on numbers rather
than on labor policy would deny protection when one employee acts on a
matter that is, in fact, of concern to the group.
In Meyers, for example, the discharged employee's protest represented not
only his own concern, but also that of at least one other member of the bargain-
ing unit. Similarly, in Traylor-Pamco, which the Board used as an example
of mere individual activity in its Meyers opinion, two employees simultaneously
protested a matter that had already been made known as a concern of an
even larger group. In both cases, the concurrent concern of more than one
employee should have been sufficient evidence of "concert" to fall within
the policy of section 7. Nothing is gained by forcing employees to virtually
hold hands and speak simultaneously in order to claim statutory protection.
Rather, consistent with the Act's emphasis on fostering group activity as a
way of countering employer power, individual protests should qualify for
section 7 protection if they, in fact rather than in fiction, represent a matter
of concern to the group.
Seen in that light, much of the criticism of prior Board decisions in Meyers
is unwarranted. Granted, the fictitious group interest of Alleluia and its progeny
was unconvincing. Moreover, the Board is certainly subject to criticism for
130. See, e.g., supra note 123.
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inconsistency in some of its decisions.' At least some of that criticism,
however, misses the point. In Ontario Knife and Steere Dairy, for example,
the individual protests deserved protection because they manifested and grew
out of a group concern over employment decisions. Although Capitol
Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 32 where an employee's discharge for
complaining about the condition of the parking lot access road was upheld,
has been criticized as inconsistent with the fictitious group concern theory
propounded in Alleluia, 33 it is distinguishable from Steere Dairy and Ontario
Knife. There was no evidence in Capitol that any other employee had ever
given the matter any thought. 34 In Ontario Knife and Steere Dairy, on the
131. See, e.g., Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 297-99. One of the cases cited by the authors
is inconsistent even as to its treatment of the same protest. In Auto-Truck Federal Credit Union,
232 N.L.R.B 1024 (1977), an employee complained to management about the discharge of a
co-worker, and her own salary. The Board upheld the ALJ's conclusion that the complaint was
not concerted as to the discharge (because she only complained about her salary) but was con-
certed as to the discharge (because "there is nothing of more moment" to employees than
discharge). Id. at 1028. Presumably money, too, would be a matter of common concern, particularly
since the discharged employee (who was the subject of the complaint) had complained about
her salary as well. See id. at 1026.
132. 248 N.L.R.B. 851 (1980).
133. See, e.g., Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 299 n.39.
134. The Board said:
Thus, on the record before us, there is no evidence that Jimenez [the discharged
employee] acted in concert with any other employee; nor is there evidence or reason
to infer that his complaint touched a matter of common concern. Indeed, the record
does not indicate that any other employee considered the condition of the road
important enough to complain about, or even that employees had discussed the
matter among themselves.
Capitol, 248 N.L.R.B. at 851.
Similarly, in Maietta Trucking Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 794 (1971), an employee's discharge resulted
from his individual inquiry about a pay raise. The trial examiner found no credible evidence
that the employee had been designated by his co-workers to speak, or that they otherwise shared
his concern. Id. at 795.
Approval of the Board's action in Capitol should not be taken to mean, however, that criticism
of its decisions for inconsistency is unwarranted. In Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255
(1965), two employees agreed to monitor restroom usage after a superior had rebuked the female
employees for its unsanitary condition. The supervisor later warned the two employees against
spying on the other workers. Id. at 256. Later, one of the employees, Ramirez, gave the owner
a letter complaining about working conditions including the restroom reprimand. The letter asserted
that the majority of the employees were "disgusted" with their treatment. Id. at 261. Ramirez
was discharged for writing the letter. The Board, disagreeing with its trial examiner, found that
the discharge did not violate section 8(a)(l). Id. at 258. It noted that Ramirez had acted alone,
had not consulted either with other employees or the union, and said there was no evidence
that the content of the letter reflected the views of other employees. Id. at 257.
The Board's decision is clearly contrary to the rationale reported ten years later in Alleluia,
but which had already surfaced in 1959 in Guernsey-Muskingum Coop., Inc., 124 N.L.R.B.
618 (1959), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960) (individual complaints concerted because "of
moment to the group"). Since the employees had been locked out of their restroom for a time,
155 N.L.R.B. at 256, one might assume that the supervisor's action was "of moment to the
group" and that Ramirez' complaint was on behalf of the other employees, as well as herself.
Moreover, the agreement between Ramirez and one other employee to monitor restroom usage,
as well as their observation of the restroom, was clearly concerted activity. Curiously, the Board
found that the letter was not simply an extension of the "spying" since the letter principally
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other hand, as well as in Meyers and Traylor-Pamco, other employees had
complained about the very same subjects that prompted the protests. Consistent
with the policy of the Act, the Board should protect protests that reflect the
actual interests of a group. It has no authority, however, to intervene in ac-
tion taken by a single employee solely in his own interest, even if other
employees conceivably could be interested in the same matter.
The interpretation recommended here should not be taken as an endorse-
ment of the traditional Board test, retained by Meyers, that the employer
have knowledge of the concerted nature of the protest. 13- The only require-
ment should be that the protest involve a matter that is, in fact, a group
concern. The genesis of the knowledge requirement in concerted activity cases
is not entirely clear.1 36 What is clear is the result: employer ignorance of the
concerted nature of a protest is a defense to a section 8(a)(1) charge.' 37
Gorman and Finkin criticize the knowledge requirement, both because it
is applied inconsistently by the Board and the courts and because it "frustrates
criticized a supervisor. Id. at 258. That analysis ignores the fact that the supervisor's allegations
against the employees, and her decision to lock the restroom, prompted both the "spying" and,
later, the letter. The Board might easily have found Ramirez' protest an outgrowth of concerted
activity.
Presumably, the Meyers test would not encompass Ramirez' conduct in Continental Mfg.,
since she had no authorization to act from her co-workers. Under the interpretation proposed
by this article, however, Ramirez' conduct would clearly have been concerted activity since her
agreement to monitor the restroom with one other employee showed that its condition was, in
fact, of concern to the group. The same is true in Del E. Webb Realty and Management Co.,
216 N.L.R.B. 593 (1975), where the Board upheld the discharge of an individual letterwriter
notwithstanding evidence that other employees contributed ideas and assisted in typing.
Another case, criticized by Gorman and Finkin for inconsistency with Alleluia was, nonetheless,
correctly decided under the theory advanced here. In Tabernacle Community Hosp., 233 N.L.R.B.
1425 (1977), an employee was discharged for writing a letter, alleging that action taken against
her was not in accordance with an employee handbook distributed to all employees. The Board's
dismissal of the complaint might raise questions under Alleluia and its progeny since compliance
with the handbook might be presumed to be a matter of common concern. There was, however,
no indication that any other employee shared the same concern or, for that matter, was even
aware of the problem. While the complaining employee need not procure a co-worker to join
in the letter to enjoy the protection of the Act, the statute at least requires some evidence that
other employees in fact share the same concerns. See also Northeastern Dye Works, 203 N.L.R.B.
1222 (1973) (Board correctly decided that employees' complaints about a co-worker were in
furtherance of a private feud and were not on behalf of other employees).
135. "Once the activity is found to be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in
addition, the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's activity ...and the
adverse employment action at issue (e.g., discharge) was motivated by the employee's protected
concerted activity." Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1025, 1029 (1984). The knowledge requirement has been applied by the courts of appeals as
well as the Board. See, e.g., Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 151-55.
136. The Sixth Circuit applied the test, without citation to previous authority, in 1949. See
NLRB v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 179 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1949). In discussing the issue, the
court simply noted that the evidence did not disclose employer knowledge of any concerted activity.
However, the court also seemed to say that a number of employees had acted individually and
that such conduct was not concerted in any event. Id. at 509.
137. In Air Surrey, for example, the court of appeals refused to find a violation when an
employee was discharged for what was clearly concerted activity, because the employer had no
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the objectives of the statute. ' ' 3 Their view that section 7 should protect
individual as well as concerted conduct rests partly on the practical advan-
tages of discarding a rule that protects employees engaged in concerted activi-
ty only if the employer has knowledge of that fact. 39 However, they also
point out the advantages of the knowledge requirement to the employer, who
is protected against liability "unfairly... imposed by surprise" if concerted
activity is not discovered until after a discharge.'
Writing on a much broader issue, Professor Paul Barron has, at least
implicitly, endorsed the knowledge requirement in concerted activity cases by
arguing that an employer cannot violate the Act if his action is not related
to protected concerted activity. 4 ' In brief, he argues that Congress did not
intend to limit an employer's freedom to deal with employees "if he acts
without regard to organization and concerted activity of his employees."'142
Clearly, under this rationale, the employer must know that employee activity
is concerted before any violation is possible.
Although Barron's argument may seem plausible, it ignores the basic policy
of the Act. The Board's focus should be on the free exercise of employee
rights, not on the purpose of the employer. Granted, there are some section
8(a)(3)'43 discrimination cases in which employer motivation is an element of
the offense and knowledge of employee involvement in union or concerted
activity may be essential to proof of motive.'44 But in many other cases, notably
knowledge that more than one employee was involved. Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d
256, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1979). For a more detailed discussion of Air Surrey, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 151-55.
138. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 350-51.
139. The authors say:
If... the employer has imposed discipline not for some independent job-related
"cause" but rather for a worker's protest or inquiry regarding wages or working
conditions, that should be sufficient to find a violation, even without proof that
the employer knew that a second employee was implicated. What public policy
demands that the employer ... be permitted ... to insulate itself against statutory
liability merely by neglecting to ask whether ... [one] employee ... was in the
company of other employees?
Id. at 352.
140. Id. at 353.
141. Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEx. L. REv. 421, 425-26 (1981).
142. Barron says that, read literally, sections 7 and 8(a)(1) could prohibit "all employer activity
that adversely affects employees' protected rights in any way." Id. at 425. He argues, however,
that such a broad prohibition was not intended by Congress, which meant to sanction only employer
conduct that responded to employee concerted activity. Id. at 427.
143. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), provides, in part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion. .. "
144. The question of employer motive has provoked considerable commentary. For example,
in Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The
Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968), and in Getman, Section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. REv.
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most section 8(a)(1) charges, a violation is made out simply by demonstrating
an adverse effect on employee section 7 rights.l' Not every deleterious effect
on employee organizational rights violates section 8(a)(1). Sometimes employer
interests outweigh the section 7 rights of employees. In most of those cases,
however, the employer has a legitimate business interest that is not directly
related to employee organizational activity. In cases involving distribution of
union literature and solicitation of union members, for example, the employer
can limit some union activity on working time or on company premises because
of legitimate property and managerial rights. As long as union solicitation
is not singled out for special treatment, an employer can properly insist that
working time is for work. However, employers who limit solicitation on
non-working time, even in working areas, violate section 8(a)(1) whether the
focus of the restraint was union solicitation or some other form of
communication."" In short, the Board considers whether an effect of the
employer's action was to interfere with employee rights, not whether the
employer intended the interference. Moreover, the legitimacy of an employee's
conduct is determined by asking if it was protected, not if employer ignorance
disqualified it as concerted. A similar analysis should control concerted activity
cases. The emphasis should be the impact of employer action on activity pro-
tected by section 7, not the employer's knowledge of concert.' 7
Assessing liability against an employer who retaliates against an employee
in ignorance of a concerted protest does not interfere with any significant
735 (1965) the authors discuss a confusing line of Supreme Court cases. Compare NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Co., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) with American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300 (1965) and NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
Although a detailed review of section 8(a)(3) and the question of motive is beyond the scope
of this article, it is generally acknowledged that in the most typical case, that of discriminatory
discharge, the General Counsel must establish an anti-union motive in order to prove a violation.
See, e.g., R. GoiiAN, supra note 86, at 137-38. See also NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983). Knowledge that the discharged employee was involved in union
activity is an essential element of the violation. See, e.g., Tm DEVELOPNcG LABOR LAW (C. Morris
2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as C. Morris].
145. See, e.g., R. Go At, supra note 86, at 132-34. See also American Freightways Co.,
124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959):
[I]nterference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not
turn on the employer's motive or on whether the coercion succeeded or failed.
The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be
said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.
146. Detailed discussion of the law concerning distribution and solicitation is beyond the scope
of this article. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See generally R.
GoRmAN, supra note 86, at 179-94.
147. As recognized by Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 352-53, the Supreme Court has
not squarely addressed the issue of employer knowledge in concerted activity cases. Its opinion
in NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964), however, strongly suggests that knowledge
is not essential. In that case the employer discharged two known union adherents because it
had been informed, erroneously, that they- had threatened to dynamite the plant. Id. at 21-22.
Despite the employer's good faith belief, the Supreme Court found the discharges to violate
section 8(a)(1), focusing instead on the effect of the action on the section 7 rights of employees.
Gorman and Finkin argue forcefully that the same principles should guide cases in which the
employer had no knowledge of the nature of the employees' concerted activity:
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employer interest. Presumably, an employer who discharges an employee for
refusing to work or for otherwise lodging a protest will claim the need to
maintain discipline or production efficiency, legitimate enough concerns when
applied to individual action for individual benefits. In fact, in the absence
of concerted or union activity, the Act does not limit employer action against
employees at all. 14 8 If the individual's protest is part of a concerted effort,
however, the discharge is the result of activity protected by the Act, thereby
denying employees the express rights guaranteed them by section 7. While
an employer's interest in controlling the workplace might be strong enough
to regulate the time and place of some non-work activity (as in the solicita-
tion cases), it is not so strong as to overcome all the protection section 7
grants to concerted activity. Nor is it possible to balance interests in the
concerted activity cases in the same fashion the Board employs in other sec-
tion 8(a)(1) cases. In solicitation and distribution cases, for example, the
employer can protect the workplace, but only to a degree. Thus, employees
are permitted to solicit for union membership in working areas, as long as
they are on non-working time. Similarly, employees may distribute literature
on company property, but not in working areas. In that way, the concerns
of both employees and employer are accommodated.' 49
No similar accommodation is possible, however, when an employer
discharges an employee in ignorance of a concerted protest." Given that limita-
tion, any employer interest that would abridge the section 7 right to engage
in concerted activity must be compelling. About the most that can be said
in defense of employer rights is the argument advanced by Gorman and Finkin:
employers who act in good faith against what they believe is individual conduct
might be unfairly surprised to learn subsequently that the employee's action
To treat such a discharge as a violation of 8(a)(1) is wholly consistent with the
long-established doctrine (exemplified by Burnup & Sims itself) that the key to a
violation of that section is not the employer's illicit motive but rather the coercive
effect upon the exercise of section 7 rights.
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 352-53.
It must be pointed out, however, that the NLRB rule approved by the Board in Burnup &
Sims included the element of employer knowledge:
[Section] 8(a)(1) is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the
time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the
basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activi-
ty, and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct.
379 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).
148. That is, section 7 guarantees to employees the right to organize, to join unions, to bargain
collectively through freely chosen representatives and to engage in concerted activity "for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The unfair labor practice
provisions of section 8 secure those rights. Section 7, however, is not a general grant of employ-
ment security. See supra note 118.
149. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 (1945); Stoddard-Quirk
Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962).
150. The employer is not entirely at the mercy of the employee's concerted activity. In some
cases, the purpose of the activity or the nature of the protest might render it unprotected. See
infra text accompanying notes 161-65. Even though unprotected, however, it is concerted activity.
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was part of a concerted protest. Whatever other employer interests the Act
may recognize, freedom from surprise is not one of them. Little can be said
for a rule that allows employers to retaliate against admittedly concerted ac-
tivity only to save them the embarrassment of rescinding their previous action.
There are also practical reasons for dispensing with the knowledge require-
mint. As noted earlier, the Board's consistency of application is hardly
praiseworthy. An even more serious problem is highlighted by the facts of
Air Surrey where four employees decided to make inquiries at a bank about
their employer's solvency. The ALJ found that all four intended to go into
the bank, but, because they were unable to find a parking space, employee
Patton went in alone while the other three remained in the car. When the
employer confronted the employees, all but Patton denied involvement.' 5' The
court of appeals found it "clear" that Patton was engaged in protected
concerted activity, but refused to enforce the Board's unfair labor practice
finding because the employer did not know "of the concerted nature of
Patton's activity. '152
Given the nature of the employer's investigation, his failure to discover
the involvement of other employees is not surprising. The ALJ found that
the employer was "mad" and, after a meeting with all but two of the employees
(Patton was one of the absentees), left at least one with the impression that
''someone was going to get fired.''' In view of that atmosphere and the
considerable disparity of power between employer and employee, particularly
in a nonunion workplace, one might expect the three employees who remained
in the car to deny any involvement. Patton, who was easily identifiable as
the employee who entered the bank,"' was then exposed alone to the
employer's wrath. The nature of Patton's conduct, however, should not have
been determined by after-the-fact declarations of other employees, who may
have thought better of their earlier involvement or who may have been
intimidated by an angry employer. Whether his activity was concerted should
have been determined by the Board from evidence of other employee involve-
ment at the time of the protest. 55 The knowledge requirement, then, not only
advances no legitimate employer interest, but also significantly impairs the
151. Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1067 (1977), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1979).
152. 601 F.2d at 257. In reviewing the AL's recommended order, the Board ignored the issue
of employer knowledge altogether, instead premising liability on the Alleluia rationale, alluding
to "the likelihood that the other employees, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, shared
his interest. . . ." 229 N.L.R.B. at 1064.
153. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1067.
154. The bank teller provided a physical description of the employee who entered the bank.
In addition, when confronted by the employer, Patton admitted his involvement. Id.
155. Testimony from those employees would have been shielded from employer retaliation
by section 8(a)(4): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this [Act].
." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982).
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free exercise of section 7 rights by exposing employees to the capriciousness
of co-workers and the domination of employers.
In sum, the focus in concerted activity cases should be the existence of
objective evidence that the employee action was prompted by a group con-
cern. The Meyers requirement that an employee actually be authorized to act
on behalf of co-workers places undue emphasis on formality and ignores the
underlying policy of section 7 to foster employee activity that can spawn
collective bargaining or other effective employee countermeasures to employer
power. Nor should it matter if the employer has actual or imputed knowledge
of concerted activity. The Board's primary concern should be protecting
employee activity from employer retaliation, not safeguarding employers from
embarrrassment or protecting other nonexistent management interests.
C. The Problems with the Interboro Doctrine
Although the branch of constructive concerted activity identified as the
Interboro doctrine met with only limited acceptance in the courts of appeals,
the debate between the Board and those courts has now been resolved by
the Supreme Court. Given the attitudes expressed by the Board in Meyers
as well as the conservative tone of its other recent decisions,'5 6 it is questionable
that Interboro would have survived Board scrutiny at all, but for the Supreme
Court's decision in City Disposal. While in theory the Board could still reject
constructive concerted activity for individuals seeking to enforce labor con-
tracts (since strictly speaking, the Supreme Court simply held that the Inter-
boro doctrine was a "reasonable interpretation of the Act," thereby leaving
open the possibility of other reasonable interpretations),' 57 it is unlikely that
the Board will do so. Barring Supreme Court review of Meyers or a similar
case, the only individual protests eligible for the Act's protection are those
which seek enforcement of labor contracts. Ironically, those employees are
less in need of Board assistance than are employees in nonunionized work-
places who do not enjoy contractual grievance-arbitration procedures, just-
cause disciplinary provisions, or the support of unions. While unionized
employees now enjoy the protection of both union advocacy and fictitious
156. As of this writing, three of the four Board members were appointed by President Reagan.
Recently, the Board has decided numerous cases reversing prior doctrine, prompting allegations
that the Board now has a conservative, or pro-management, bias. In addition to Meyers, see,
e.g., Milwaukee Spring, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (Jan. 23, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (1984),
and Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 198 (April 25, 1984), 116 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984). For
accounts of controversy generated by the Board in the popular press, see Greenhouse, Labor
Board Stirs Up a Storm, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, § 3, at 4, col. 3, and Middleton, NLRB:
An Agency in Turmoil, Nat'l L.J. July 2, 1984, at 1.
157. In NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975), the Supreme Court specifically
addressed the Board's ability to change an interpretation of the Act, even though it had been
accepted by the courts:
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concerted activity, individuals in nonunion shops are protected only by
adherence to the rigid guidelines of Meyers.
As constructive concerted activity, the Interboro doctrine is easier to sustain
than the branch of the theory represented by Alleluia. In Alleluia, the Board
merely presumed that other employees supported an individual's conduct in-
voking statutory rights or otherwise protecting matters thought to be of com-
mon concern. Although that presumption may have been mere fiction in
Alleluia, it has more force in Interboro. It is not controversial to assert that
employees have a common interest in the enforcement of rights won in col-
lective bargaining. Clearly, a union steward who individually prosecutes
grievances on behalf of other employees is engaged in exactly the kind of
activity meant to be shielded by section 7.'1 It is not much of an extension
to hold that individuals should be able to enforce those same rights without
the intervention of a bargaining agent. Indeed, the Act expressly so provides.",
In addition to a more plausible assertion of the "matter of mutual concern"
theory, Interboro also seems justified under the rationale the Supreme Court
adopted in City Disposal: the individual action is but an extension of the
concerted activity that produced the contract. Stated differently (and perhaps
more accurately), contract enforcement is merely a part of the continuous
process of collective bargaining. 6 An individual's involvement in contract
enforcement, then, would clearly seem to be involvement in the concerted
activity of collective bargaining. Finally, even under the theory propounded
in this article, individual efforts at contract enforcement appear to constitute
concerted activity. That is, there would seem to be no clearer objective evidence
of actual group interest in such conduct that the existence of a collectively
bargained agreement. Despite the apparent ease of compliance with the dictates
of the statute, however, the Interboro doctrine stirs larger issues than other
We agree that its earlier precedents do not impair the validity of the Board's con-
struction .... The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach
is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the develop-
ment of this important aspect of the national labor laws would misconceive the
nature of administrative decisionmaking .... The responsibility to adapt the Act
to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.
158. See, e.g., Union Fork & Hoe Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 907 (1979).
159. The first and second provisos to section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), read:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract
or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative
has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
For further discussion of the effect of section 9(a), see infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
160. "The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by
which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement .... The grievance
procedure is, in other words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining process." United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
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forms of constructive concerted activity. The Court's failure to confront those
problems adequately, and the potential scope of its opinion, is therefore even
more bothersome than the Board's action in Meyers.
The Court had little trouble classifying an individual's refusal to drive a
garbage truck as concerted activity. As the Court pointed out, however, finding
concert is only half the battle. In order to enjoy the benefits of that statute,
employee activity must be not only concerted, but protected as well. 6 ' The
precise range of protected activity is not entirely clear. Mere insubordination
is not necessarily unprotected, since most concerted protests mounted by
employees might be so viewed, at least by employers. In some cases the Board
has classified as unprotected, conduct that is "disloyal" or "indefensible."' ' 62
In City Disposal, the Court seemed to say that while an individual's honest
and reasonable invocation of a contractual right is concerted activity, it may
be unprotected if the honest and reasonable belief turns out to be wrong.' 63
Noting that an employee's unjustified refusal to work in the face of a no-
strike clause would be unprotected activity, 161 the Court upheld the refusal
to work at issue as concerted, but remanded the case to determine whether
it was protected. That determination involves nothing more than a matter
of contract interpretation.
The contract expressly provided that employees had the right to refuse to
operate unsafe equipment "unless such refusal in unjustified." The employer
contended that that language compelled the employee to work unless the truck
was "objectively unsafe."'"6 Presumably, the language might also mean that
an employee's action is unjustified only if it is not supported by reasonable
evidence and by a good faith belief. The Court offered no view as to the
proper interpretation, but noted that if the contract compelled an employee
to drive a truck that was, in fact, safe, even though the employee might
legitimately believe otherwise, the refusal was unprotected concerted activity.
On remand, then, the Board will not use statutory standards, or otherwise
161. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1514 (1984).
162. In NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), the Supreme Court held unprotected
a concerted protest of employees that grew out of a contract negotiation. The employees' activity
included handbills that impugned the employer's television programming. Characterizing the issue
as whether the discharges were "for cause," id. at 471, the Supreme Court said: "There is no
more elemental cause for discharge of any employee than disloyalty to his employer." Id. at
472. For a general discussion of those concerted activities that fall outside the protection of
the Act, see R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at 302-25, and C. Morris, supra note 144, at 159-64.
163. The Court said:
In this case, because Brown reasonably and honestly invoked his right to avoid
driving unsafe trucks, his action was concerted. It may be that the collective-
bargaining agreement prohibits an employee from refusing to drive a truck that
he reasonably believes to be unsafe, but that is, in fact, perfectly safe. If so, Brown's
action was concerted but unprotected.
City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
164. Id. at 1514.
165. Id. at 1516.
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apply its administrative expertise to the facts; it will simply interpret the
contract.
Although the Board is not empowered to redress contract violations, there
is no doubt that, in order to determine unfair labor practice charges, the Board
can interpret collective bargaining agreements. In section 8(a)(5)' 6 unlawful
refusal to bargain cases, for example, the Board often interprets the labor
contract to assess the merit of an employer's claim that the union has waived
its right to bargain over a certain subject. 67 There is a difference, however,
between cases like that and the issue presented in City Disposal. In section
8(a)(5) cases the statute expressly commands that employers bargain in good
faith. Although either party can, by agreement, waive the right to bargain
over certain issues, 68 the statutory obligation to bargain is unrelated to the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement. That is, if a union has been
certified or recognized as the collective bargaining representative of employees,
both the employer and the union must bargain in good faith, whether a
collective bargaining agreement exists or not.'6 9 Although the execution of
a contract may suspend the bargaining obligation for certain subjects during
the contract term, the statute, not the contract, is the source of the bargain-
ing obligation. Contract interpretation plays a role only to the extent of deter-
mining whether or not one result of the statutorily mandated collective bargain-
ing was to suspend negotiations temporarily.' 70
166. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of [section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)] .. " For a discussion of the
obligations section 8(a)(5) places on employers, see generally R. GoRmAN, supra note 86, at 399-495.
167. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), where the Board inter-
preted a provision of the collective bargaining agreement in order to resolve the employer's
contention that the union had waived its right to bargain over a premium pay plan. The provi-
sion in question reserved to the employer the right to pay a premium rate to recognize "special
fitness." Id. at 423. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's conclusion that the contract clause
did not permit the employer to unilaterally increase wages for an entire crew, thereby enforcing
the Board's decision that the union had not waived its right to bargain and the employer's action
violated section 8(a)(5). Id. at 428.
168. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). The Board requires
such waivers to be in "clear and unmistakable" language. See generally C. Morris, supra note
144, at 640-45.
169. See generally Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
170. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), for example, the Supreme
Court, after discussing Congress' decision not to vest the Board with jurisdiction to decide con-
tract disputes, said:
But in this case the Board has not construed a labor agreement to determine the
extent of the contractual rights which were given the union by the employer. It
has not imposed its own view of what the terms and conditions of the labor agree-
ment should be. It has done no more than merely enforce a statutory right which
Congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the
process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment-"to provide a means
by which agreement may be reached." The Board's interpretation went only so
far as was necessary to determine that the union did not agree to give up these
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In City Disposal, on the other hand, the Court's opinion makes the contract,
not the statute, the source of employee rights. Under Meyers and consistent
judicial, if not administrative, interpretation, unrepresented employees have
no right to complain about or to protest working conditions individually unless
expressly authorized by their co-workers. It is the existence of the contract,
then, that creates an individual's rights under the Interboro doctrine. Having
created the rights solely because the contract exists, City Disposal would then
have the Board presume to determine the scope of the statutory right by
reference to the contract's terms. This is not interpreting a contract for the
purpose of determining a waiver or otherwise assisting in statutory analysis.
It is elevating contract rights to the level of statutory rights. In short, City
Disposal allows the Board to use its statutory unfair labor practice procedures
as an instrument of contract enforcement, thereby not only frustrating whatever
enforcement mechanism exists in the contract, but no doubt denigrating the
status of the union as exclusive representative as well.
1. The Effect on Arbitration
Dispute settlement under collective bargaining agreements has commanded
considerable attention from the Supreme Court. Although there are occasional
signs that the NLRB is suspicious of labor arbitration, 7' the Supreme Court's
commitment has been fairly consistent. Starting with Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills'7 in 1957, which made agreements to arbitrate specifically
enforceable, and the celebrated Steelworker's Trilogy in 1960,1 which
statutory safeguards. Thus, the Board, in necessarily construing a labor agreement
to decide this unfair labor practice case, has not exceeded the jurisdiction laid out
for it by Congress.
Id. at 428.
171. The Board's reluctance to defer to labor arbitrator's decisions under the Collyer Wire
doctrine or the Spielberg doctrine is sometimes alleged to result from narrowed perception of
the role of arbitrators in settling disputes and to undermine the integrity of the process. See
infra text accompanying notes 195-207 for a discussion of these doctrines. See, e.g., Kansas City
Star Co., 1236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867 (1978) (Truesdae, concurring); Van de Water, The NLRB
... New Directions, 12 STmrsoN L. Rnv. 297 (1983); Wollett, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 1982-83 Term, 113 LAB. RrL. REP. (BNA) 301, 308 (1983); Comment, Judicial Review
and the Trend Toward More Stringent NLRB Standards on Arbitral Deferrals, 129 U. PA. L.
REv. 738 (1981).
172. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
173. The Steelworker's Trilogy consists of three landmark cases decided by the Court on the
same day. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), the Court
cautioned lower courts not to become involved in the merits of a case when called upon by
one party to a labor contract to enforce the arbitration provisions of the agreement. Even claims
which were frivolous or apparently without merit were to be sent to arbitration if governed on
their face by the contract. Id. at 567-68. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the Court further limited the ability of the courts to become
involved in the merits of arbitrable disputes. The Court created a virtual presumption of ar-
bitrability, absent "only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from ar-
bitration." Id. at 585. Finally, in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
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considerably elevated the status of both labor arbitration and labor arbitrators,
the Court's decisions have often encouraged resort to a peaceful system of
dispute resolution as an alternative to industrial strife. 7' Although there has
been some accommodation to other significant employee rights,'" the Court,
just ten months before City Disposal, appeared to reaffirm its commitment
to labor arbitration.' 76 The depth of that commitment, however, is questioned
by City Disposal.
Once recognized or certified, the union becomes the exclusive representative
of all employees in the bargaining unit.'77 Although section 9(a)'78 allows
employees to present grievances to their employers individually, resolution
is controlled by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and, in any
event, the Supreme Court has neutered most of the force of section 9(a).7
Like it or not, the union negotiates on behalf of all employees in the unit.
Each employee is bound to the union's effort and by any collective bargain-
ing agreement it negotiates. 8 '
The principle of exclusive representation is not as ominous as it sounds,
though it has been criticized.'' In the first place, the union owes each employee
in the unit, member or not, a duty of fair representation, enforceable either
363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Court limited the ability of courts to assess the merits of a case in
reviewing an arbitrator's decision.
174. See, e.g., Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 U.S.
243 (1977) (dispute arbitrable notwithstanding expiration of agreement); Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (strike over arbitrable issue enjoined in favor of
arbitration); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (successor obligated to arbitrate
under predecessor's labor contract).
175. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration award does
not preclude employee from asserting claim based on federal civil rights legislation). See also
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
176. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983), where
the Court upheld an arbitrator's award that an employer who had laid off employees pursuant
to a conciliation agreement with the EEOC had nevertheless violated the collective bargaining
agreement.
177. See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), which provides, in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment ...
178. See supra note 159.
179. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
In that case, the employer lawfully discharged two employees who had picketed a department
store in an attempt to force a meeting with management to discuss allegations of race discrimina-
tion. The Court said that section 9(a) was not intended to allow employees to force employers
to hear individual grievances. Rather, it was intended to permit employees to deal with employee
grievances individually without fear of violating section 8(a)(5). Id. at 61 n.12. It is, therefore,
not unlawful for an employer to refuse to entertain a grievance asserted pursuant to the section
9(a) proviso. See infra text accompanying notes 216-21.
180. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
181. See, e.g., Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the Interests of Individual
Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975).
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in court or before the NLRB.' 82 More importantly, a union that consistently
ignored the wishes of its constituency would not long retain its representative
status. Within the confines of those limitations, however, "[t]he union's power
is the power to govern."' 83 Employees have only those benefits and employ-
ment perquisites negotiated by the union. They are unable to bargain for
themselves. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement ordinarily limits
the employee to private contract enforcement procedures, typically a grievance
arbitration process, ordinarily administered solely by the union.' 8 The Supreme
Court has consistently upheld the enforceability of the exclusive resort to
arbitration. Employees may look outside the contract only when the union
has unjustifiably failed to make internal procedures available or has processed
a grievance in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or perfunctory manner.'15
These restrictions are not intended to penalize individual employees. Rather,
they serve to unify the group by centralizing its power in the union. In that
fashion, employees are better able to combat employers' authority. The prin-
ciple of exclusive representation, generally, and the union's control over the
arbitration mechanism, specifically, enhance the power of the union as the
bargaining representative, thereby making it a more potent force in its deal-
ing with the employer.
There was a grievance-arbitration procedure in City Disposal. The day after
his discharge, employee Brown filed a grievance. The union, finding no merit
in Brown's contention, refused to process it.'86 Neither the opinion of the
Supreme Court nor that of the ALJ explains the reason for the union's
inaction.'87 There is no question, however, that as exclusive bargaining
representative, the union can (and ordinarily does) retain control over the
grievance arbitration process.' 88 The Supreme Court has said expressly that
employees have no right to have grievances arbitrated.'89 Instead, the union
182. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforce-
ment denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The Court defined the duty of fair representation
in Steele as the obligation to represent each member of the bargaining unit (whether or not a
union member) "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 323 U.S.
at 204. For a more detailed discussion, see generally R. GosMA, supra note 86, at 695-728.
183. Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. Rev. 805, 816 (1951).
184. For a general discussion of the law of arbitration, see R. GoIUaN, supra note 86, at
540-83. An exhaustive review of the vast literature generated by labor arbitration is beyond the
scope of this article. For frequently cited works, however, see F. ELKounu & E. ELKOURI, How
ARBrrRATiON WORKS (3d ed. 1973); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. Rev.
1482 (1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1959); Feller, A
General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. Rev. 663 (1973).
185. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-86 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
186. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1509 (1984).
187. The opinion of the NLRB is reported at 256 N.L.R.B. 451 (1981).
188. The union's control is ordinarily exercised at the higher levels of the procedure, typically
by retaining power to determine which cases are arbitrated. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967).
189. See, e.g., id. at 191.
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has broad discretion, tempered by its duty of fair representation, to process,
settle, or deny outright the complaints of individual employees. 90 There is
nothing in either the Board's or the Supreme Court's opinion indicating that
Brown (or the Board) ever alleged that the union's action violated its duty
of fair representation. In the ordinary course, then, Brown's case was finished.
He had no right to arbitrate that grievance himself and the union had a right
to determine in good faith (even erroneously) that the grievance was without
merit. '"
City Disposal, however, allows an employee to either circumvent the union's
action or, worse, to ignore the grievance arbitration provisions of the con-
tract altogether. Although both the Board and the Supreme Court treated
the case as a question of employee rights arising under section 8(a)(1), the
resolution of the unfair labor practice issue will require the Board to make
exactly the same determination that the union has already made (i.e., whether
or not the grievance has merit), or, in an appropriate case, to reconsider an
arbitrator's decision denying relief to an employee. The Supreme Court
observed correctly that, under NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., the Board
can interpret the contract. The issue, however, which the Supreme Court and
the NLRB treated in only cursory fashion, is whether the Board should in-
volve itself in contract interpretation in a City Disposal type case.'93
In its opinion, the Court tried to neutralize criticism that its decision would
undermine arbitration by advancing two arguments. First, the Court (reminis-
cent of Gorman and Finkin) said that it was clearly concerted activity when
two employees invoked collectively bargained rights, regardless of any effect
on arbitration. Thus, there was no reason to "single out" protests by one
employee as more subversive of arbitration that similar protests by two
employees.' 9 As discussed earlier, focusing on this so-called anomaly merely
diverts attention away from the issue. If Congress chose to protect a group
190. See id. at 190-93. See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Union News Co.
v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
191. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that settlement
of a meritorious grievance breached the duty of fair representation. The Court said:
For if a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient merit to justify
arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation because
a judge or jury later found the grievance meritorious, the union's incentive to settle
such grievances short of arbitration would be seriously reduced.
Id. at 192-93.
192. 385 U.S. 421 (1967). See discussion supra note 167.
193. Although the majority virtually ignored the threat its decision poses to arbitration, Justice
O'Connor, in dissent, did not. She asserted that the Court's argument "confuses the employees'
substantive contract entitlements with the process by which those entitlements are to be vindicated."
City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1518. She also criticized the broad role in contract interpretation
assigned to the Board by the Court's opinion: "[Tihe fact that the Board can resolve contractual
matters incident to unfair labor practice disputes does not give it authority to make unfair labor
practices out of the contractual disputes themselves." Id. at 1517.
194. Id. at 1514-15.
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activity, a necessary consequence of that decision was that small groups as
well as large ones are covered. The fact that small groups have little more
power than individuals have may mean that Congress could or should have
covered individuals as well; it does not mean that Congress did. More impor-
tantly, the Court's argument proceeds on the premise that two employees
should be able to have their contractdal grievance heard by the Board, not-
withstanding any effect on the arbitral process. Although that may now be
the law, two employees should have no more right to such relief than an
individual employee has. Instead, employees asserting rights under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement should be confined to their contractual remedies.
The Court also justified its conclusion that City Disposal would not under-
mine arbitration by citing the Board's deferral practices.' 95 Under the Board's
Collyer Wire doctrine, unfair labor practice charges that involve claims of
right under a collective bargaining agreement can be deferred to arbitration,
with the NLRB retaining jurisdiction for only limited purposes. 96 Recently,
the Board has broadened the scope of deferrable cases to include section 8(a)(1)
and section 8(a)(3) charges. '91 In theory, then, individuals who seek to chan-
nel their contract claims into the unfair labor practice procedure as hap-
pened in City Disposal) would find the Board unreceptive and would be relegated
to their contractual rights.
Similarly, the Board could defer contractual cases under its Spielberg
doctrine. 98 Under Spielberg, the Board will decline to assert jurisdiction over
an unfair labor practice charge if the same issue presented to the Board has
already been heard by an arbitrator, if the arbitration proceedings were fair
and regular, and if the result reached by the arbitrator is not repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act. 99 The Board has recently reaffirmed
195. Id. at 1515.
196. The Collyer Wire doctrine is named for the Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837
(1971), in which the Board decided that it would defer its processes to arbitration in a section
8(a)(5) case in which the union charged that the employer had unlawfully implemented certain
contract modification. Noting that the employer's right to take the protested action was an arbitrable
dispute, the Board said: "[B]ecause this dispute in its entirety arises from the contract between
the parties, and from the parties' relationship under the contract, it ought to be resolved in
the manner which that contract prescribes." Id. at 839. The Board retained jurisdiction to ensure
that the arbitration, in fact, took place, that the procedure was fair, and that the results were
not repugnant to the Act. Id. at 843.
The Collyer Wire decision has provoked much controversy. For an interesting exchange between
two influential scholars, see Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section
8(a)(5), 50 TExAs L. REv. 225 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schatzki, NLRB Resolution]; Getman,
Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Schatzki, A Response
to Professor Getman, 49 IND. L.J. 76 (1973); Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-Denver Co-
Exist?, A Postscript, 49 IND. L.J. 285 (1974).
197. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (Jan. 19, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1049 (1984).
198. The Spielberg doctrine is named for Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Basical-
ly, the doctrine involves deferral of Board processes when the-issue raised by an unfair labor
practice charge has already been determined by an arbitrator.
199. In International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB,
327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), the Board said:
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its commitment to the policies of Spielberg deferral. 00 If Spielberg is applied,
then, employees would not be able to use unfair labor practice proceedings
to reverse unfavorable arbitration rulings.
The primary issue is whether the Board should exercise jurisdiction over
complaints by employees that their rights under a collective bargaining agree-
ment have been violated. The fact that voluntary procedures exist limiting
the exercise of jurisdiction is not dispositive of the central question of NLRB
power. Even if it was, the history of Collyer Wire and Spielberg teaches that
the limitations they impose may not be as significant as the Court implies.
The policy of deferring section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) charges under the
Collyer Wire doctrine has been a matter of considerable controversy within
the Board. Under its decision in National Radio Co.,20 ' the Board deferred
section 8(a)(3) as well as section 8(a)(5) cases. In 1977, however, a three-way
split in General American Transportation Corp.202 resulted in a policy of defer-
ring section 8(a)(5) charges (in which the issue ordinarily was one of contrac-
tual waiver of the right to bargain) but refusing deferral in section 8(a)(1)
and section 8(a)(3) charges (which involved matters of individual, rather than
collective rights).20 3 General American Transportation remained the law until
January, 1984, when the Board decided, in United Technologies, "" that it
would once again defer section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) charges to arbitra-
tion. United Technologies resulted entirely from a change in membership on
the Board and appears to be no more stable than the makeup of the panel
itself.20 5 If the Board again returns to the rule of General American Transpor-
tation, the Court's observation in City Disposal is wrong: section 8(a)(1) charges
filed by individual employees would not be deferrable. Certainly, a major
[T]he Board... should give hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process as "part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," and voluntarily withhold
its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges involv-
ing the same subject matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings
were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities
or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.
138 N.L.R.B. at 927.
200. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Jan. 19, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1056 (1984).
201. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
202. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
203. Interestingly, General American Transportation remained the law for nearly seven years
despite the fact that its entire holding was embraced by only one member of the Board. Thus,
two members of the Board (Fanning and Jenkins) indicated their belief that the Board had no
authority to "cede its jurisdiction to private tribunals" in any unfair labor practice case. Id.
at 808. Two other members (Penello and Walther) disagreed and embraced a broad application
of Collyer Wire that would have deferred interference cases (§ 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(a)), discrimina-
tion cases (§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)), and refusal to bargain cases (§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)). Id. at
813-19. In the middle was then Chairman Betty Murphy who agreed that deferral was proper
in refusal to bargain cases, but not in cases involving individual rights. Id. at 810-13. She therefore
formed a three-person majority with Penello and Walther in agreeing to defer section 8(a)(5)
and 8(b)(3) cases, and a three-person majority with Fanning and Jenkins in refusing to defer
section 8(a)(3), 8(a)(l), 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) cases. See also Roy Robinson, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B.
828 (1977).
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policy question such as that decided in City Disposal should not be premised
on the availability of a doctrine applied as erratically as Collyer Wire.
The same is true of Spielberg deferral. Although the Board's recent Olin
Corp.206 decision purports to revitalize the doctrine, the Board admits that
application of Spielberg has been inconsistent. Members have charged that
it has often deferred to arbitrators' opinions simply because it agrees with
them and has not hesitated to overrule opinions with which it disagreed, under
the guise that they are "repugnant to the Act. ' 20 7 The history of Spielberg,
then, would appear to contradict the Court's assertion that deferral will
minimize the effect on arbitration. Instead, it may undermine the finality of
arbitration decisions, perhaps the single most important factor in the success
of labor arbitration.20 8
Given the Court's failure to confront the uncertainties of the Board's deferral
doctrines, one must question whether the Court was oblivious to the threat
its decision poses to arbitration, or whether it simply did not care. Most tell-
ing, perhaps, is the fact that neither Collyer Wire nor Spielberg would
necessarily have applied to the facts at issue in City Disposal. Clearly, Spielberg
deferral was not appropriate since there had been no arbitration. Since the
case arose while the Board was adhering to its decision in General American
Transportation, one can only speculate whether, after United Technologies,
the Board would have deferred under Collyer Wire. Since the union refused
to arbitrate the case, it seems unlikely that the Board would defer a charging
party to a procedure that is not, in fact, available. Moreover, the Board should
have no discretion to force an unwilling union to arbitrate a case it has already
determined to be without merit. In cases like City Disposal, then, it appears
that the Board will retain jurisdiction and, in effect, substitute its own processes
for the procedure provided by contract. As the Supreme Court itself has noted,
204. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (Jan. 19, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1049 (1984).
205. By the time United Technologies was decided, all of the members who decided General
American Transportation had either resigned or retired. The three Reagan appointees, supra
note 156, formed the majority in United Technologies.
206. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Jan. 19, 1984), 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1056 (1984).
In addition to adoption of Spielberg principles, Olin also overruled the Board's previous decision
in Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), which had precluded Spielberg deferral
unless the substance of the unfair labor practice charge had been presented to and considered
by the arbitrator. In Olin, the Board decided that the failure of the union to present a claim
during the arbitration proceeding could nonetheless preclude Board review if the contractual
issue considered by the arbitrator was factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue and
if the arbitrator was presented with relevant evidence to resolve the unfair labor practice dispute.
268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, slip op. at 5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
207. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, slip op. at 6, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058
("[M]isdirected zeal has resulted in such infrequent deferral by the Board that its occasional
exercise has had little substantive relationship to a mechanism which daily settles uncounted labor
disputes.... ."); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867-69 (1978) (Truesdaie, concurring).
208. Arbitration agreements typically provide that the arbitrator's decision is final and binding.
Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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the right to control contract enforcement procedures contributes greatly to
the union's effectiveness as bargaining representative. City Disposal would
seem to both undermine the union's authority and endanger the parties' reliance
on contractual procedures as the exclusive source of rights and remedies.
2. The Role of the Board
The procedure adopted in City Disposal-allowing the Board to determine
whether activity is protected by interpreting rights granted under the contract-
may pose significant danger to arbitration, by substituting the Board for the
enforcement procedure adopted by the parties. The Court's opinion seems
to treat that result as inevitable. That is, since an individual employee who
invokes contractual rights is involved in concerted activity, the validity of the
complaint affects its status as protected or unprotected. Given the potential
consequences of assigning to the Board such a broad role of contract inter-
pretation, the Court's analysis bears greater scrutiny. Even though the
conclusion that individual invocation of contract rights is concerted activity
appears plausible, one must question whether the protected nature of the
conduct should hinge on the validity of a contractual claim. Also, one must
consider whether the policy of the Act is really advanced by giving individuals
represented by a union statutory rights superior to those who have no
representation.
When employees choose a collective bargaining representative, they decide
to substitute the force of the group for whatever power (usually minimal at
best) they could have asserted as individuals. Although the exercise of group
power is intended to enhance the employment status and to improve the work-
ing conditions of individuals within the group, most individual liberty to act
is sacrificed for the good of the group. After designating a collective bargain-
ing representative, individuals lose whatever power they may have had as
individuals. They may no longer bargain on their own behalf. They may present
grievances individually under the section 9(a) proviso, but cannot force their
employer to entertain them. Even if the employer does consider a section 9(a)
grievance, its resolution is controlled by the terms of the contract negotiated
for the group. 20 9 Although the contract may be a source of rights for individual
employees, its enforcement is ordinarily reserved to the representative of the
group, which retains power to sacrifice some individual rights in the interest
of the group.
Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court's conception of the collective
bargaining agreement revealed in City Disposal is simply wrong. Implicit in
City Disposal is that rights granted to individual employees in the collective
209. The first proviso to NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), provides that individuals
have the right to present grievances and have them adjusted "as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect."
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bargaining agreement somehow transcend the enforcement mechanisms
provided by contract. In its opinion, the Court noted that employee Brown's
refusal to drive was an invocation of the right granted him by contract to
refuse to operate unsafe equipment:
Moreover, there can be no question but that Brown's refusal to drive the
truck was reasonably well directed toward the enforcement of that right.
Indeed, it would appear that there were no other means available by which
Brown could have enforced that right. If he had gone ahead and driven
. . . the issue may have been moot.
210
This passage, as well as other parts of the opinion, focuses on the right
of individual employees to invoke contractual rights. " Despite the contrary
suggestion by the Court, however, it is not true that the ordinary contract
enforcement mechanisms were unavailable to Brown. Brown might have driven
the truck, at the same time filing a grievance protesting the frustration of
his rights under the contract, an alternative the Court describes as "moot."
That characterization overstates the effect, since an arbitrator's decision not
only might have chastised the employer for ignoring Brown's rights, but also
might have clarified the situation in which employees could refuse to drive
unsafe vehicles-the same question the Board will now consider on remand.
More realistically, Brown's refusal to drive (which appeared to be the procedure
sanctioned by contract) could have been sustained by an arbitrator, resulting
in his reinstatement.
In City Disposal, however, the union refused to prosecute Brown's claim,
thereby leaving him without a contractual remedy. Implicit in the Court's
decision and in its statement that there were "no other means" of contract
enforcement, is its assumption that employees have a right-now statutorily
grounded-to enforcement of contract terms. Since the union refused to in-
voke the grievance-arbitration provision of the contract, the employee can
now enforce the contract by claiming contractual rights (either by refusing
to work or otherwise) and litigating the legality of the employer's reaction
before the NLRB. In theory, under City Disposal, an employee's invocation
of contractual rights will not even have to result in discipline in order to qualify
for relief. An employer who simply denies an individual's contractual claim
to a benefit may have "retaliated" against an employee engaged in concerted
activity (by denying a contractual right as punishment for having made the
claim), thereby invoking Board processes to determine whether or not the
contract allows the benefit.
Rather than involve itself in the merits of an individual's contractual claim,
the Board should limit its inquiry to whether an employee's attempts to invoke
a contractual grievance procedure have been frustrated. There should be no
210. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1515 (1984).
211. See, e.g., id. at 1511: "Nor would it make sense for a union to negotiate a collective-
bargaining agreement if individual employees could not invoke the rights thereby created against
their employer." See also discussion, id. at 1513-14.
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independent right of contract enforcement. If the contract establishes a
grievance-arbitration procedure as the exclusive method of implementing con-
tract rights, employees should be relegated to that procedure and protected
in its use, regardless of the merit of their claim. Attempts to enforce contract
terms outside the grievance-arbitration procedures provided by contract may
be concerted activity, but they should not enjoy the protection of section 7.
Contract rights have no metaphysical existence. They can be evaluated only
in the context of the contractual procedure created for their enforcement.
In City Disposal, for example, the right to refuse to drive unsafe trucks unless
the refusal was "unjustified" was agreed to in the context of arbitration as
the implementing procedure. The employer and the union no doubt understood
that the clause was vague and that, if problems arose, they would first attempt
a voluntary resolution and, if unsuccessful, assign the case to a mutually agreed
neutral party. This opportunity to resolve disputes through private, informal
(but binding) procedures may well have influenced the substance of the bargain.
Had the parties contemplated contract enforcement through the more formal
procedures of the courts or the Board, they might have chosen more precise
language, resulting in more demanding negotiation. The process of negotia-
tion is eased considerably when the parties believe that their disputes will be
resolved by arbitrators who, one hopes, understand the contractual relation-
ship and the bargaining process better than the Board does and, at least, are
more versed in the language and customs of labor contracts."'
The parties also understood that the right created in individual employees
was subject to union administration. In its discretion, the union might refuse
to process even a valid claim as long as its decision did not violate its duty
of fair representation. In elevating contractual rights above the context of
the contract's enforcement mechanism, the Court ignored the bargain of the
parties and the nature of individual rights under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Such rights are not inviolate. They are not independent entitlements
subject to judicial sanction or administrative enforcement. They are no more
212. One commentator has summarized the attractions of arbitration as follows:
Generally speaking, arbitration is speedier than the full Board's processes; further-
more, the parties themselves control their cases, while before the Board one of
the parties loses control to the General Counsel. The arbitrator, who may be expert
in the industry or in the labor relations of the particular plant, is almost invariably
closer to the context of the dispute than the Board or the trial examiner. The parties
have selected the arbitrator and the arbitration process; this is the manner in which
they indicated, prior to the particular disagreement, they preferred to resolve their
disputes. My own observation tells me that arbitration is far less formal, less tense,
and less exacerbating to the relationship of the parties, than a Board proceeding.
... In addition, the arbitrator has access to more flexible remedies: he can "split
the baby." Finally, if the arbitrator makes a bad decision, the parties can renegotiate
immediately, or at their next bargaining sessions, for a new contract; often, little
harm results from the arbitrator's bad award.
Schatzki, NLRB Resolution, supra note 196, at 251-52 (footnote omitted).
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valuable than the contractual procedures for enforcing them. They are to be
implemented as part of the collective agreement, through the procedures
selected by the parties. That process not only protects the employees, but fosters
collective bargaining by insulating the relationship against governmental
intrusion. City Disposal, however, impugns the integrity of the contract and
diminishes the union's status as exclusive representative, thereby impairing
its ability to provide effective representation. City Disposal did much more
than protect the right of individuals to protest; it authorized unwarranted
governmental intervention into a private contractual relationship.
The Board's only function in contract enforcement is to insure that
employees have recourse to contractually provided enforcement mechanisms.
Section 7 should protect employees who file grievances, or otherwise comply
with contractual processes, from discharge or other employer retaliation. As
the Court has recognized, grievance administration is part of the process of
collective bargaining. Employees who use the procedures provided by contract
are surely engaged in concerted activity, even if their grievance turns out to
be meritless. Even though their action may manifest a group concern, however,
employees who invoke contractual rights outside the grievance-arbitration
procedures-typically by refusing to work-should not be the subject of NLRB
concern, whether the action is taken by individuals or by groups. That is not
to say that their protests might not enjoy contractual protection. 213 Those
contractual rights, however, should be effectuated through the procedure man-
dated by contract, not through unfair labor practice procedures.
In theory, this interpretation leaves unionized employees with less statutory
protection that nonunion employees. That is, nonunion employees who act
together, or who are authorized to act by co-workers, or, under the theory
advanced here, who act over matters that are in fact of common concern
are protected by section 7. Unionized employees covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement, however, would look to the contract as the source of their
rights and protection, subject to the statutorily enforced right to use internal
enforcement procedures. Although the treatment is different, it is not
anomalous. Collective bargaining is the Act's primary vehicle for the equaliza-
tion of bargaining power between employer and employee. The Board exists
principally to protect the right of employees to choose a bargaining represen-
tative free from interference by the employer and to ensure that bargaining
proceeds in good faith once the representative is chosen. Prior to selection
of a bargaining agent, the employees' statutory right to act in concert is para-
mount. Employer retaliation against even small employee groups might
frustrate employees in their ability ultimately to bring group pressure to bear
through collective bargaining. For that reason, NLRB protection of nonunion
213. In a case like City Disposal, for example, an arbitrator might interpret the contract clause
which allows an employee to refuse to drive unsafe equipment unless the refusal is "unjustified"
to sanction a good faith refusal to work.
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employees should be vigorous, with only a demonstrated group concern
necessary to invoke the shelter of the Act.
After the bargaining representative is chosen, however, the NLRB's respon-
sibility to employees changes. The Board must still protect employees from
unlawful discrimination and safeguard those involved in collective bargaining
and the administration of the contract. It must also insure that collective
bargaining proceeds unhindered by employer or union misconduct. The primary
source of employee rights, however, should be the collective bargaining agree-
ment, not the statutory enforcement efforts of the Board. The collective
bargaining agreement represents the achievement of the Act's purpose.
Although it may not reflect complete bargaining equality, especially in the
early years, it at least represents an accommodation reached by conflicting
forces using whatever bargaining power they could muster. Absent evidence
that the bargaining process has been misused or that employees are suffering
for their union sympathies, the government has no function in the relation-
ship between employer and union. It also no longer enjoys a paternalistic
relationship with the employees. Having selected a collective bargaining
representative-that is, having adopted the procedure favored by the Act-
the union assumes the role of protector, at least with respect to the rights
provided by the collective bargaining agreement. The Board plays a role in
assuring that the union discharges its duty to the employees. It has no business,
however, enforcing contract rights or otherwise intervening in the substance
of the agreement.2"" When employees have adopted collective bargaining as
the means of combating employer power, their contractual rights are to be
determined through the collective bargaining process, not by the Board.
3. Section 9(a)
Any interpretation of the Act that limits the right of unionized employees
to file grievances must account for the proviso to section 9(a):
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargain-
ing representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Pro-
vided further, That the bargaining representative has been given oppor-
tunity to be present at such adjustment. 2 15
Gorman and Finkin, for example, argue that the right of individual employees
to complain is secured not only by section 7, but by the section 9(a) proviso
214. "So long as the parties have agreed to a private arbitrator to resolve their disputes, it
is difficult to understand why government should intervene and upset their expectations, even
if the arbitration process is not the Utopia Mr. Justice Douglas might have us believe." Schatzki,
NLRB Resolutions, supra note 196, at 252-53.
215. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
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as well.2"6 Although section 9(a) does speak of the "right" of individuals or
groups to present grievances to their employers, the force of the proviso has
been tempered considerably by the Supreme Court's decision in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization."' In that case,
the Court said that section 9(a) does not grant an affirmative right to employees
to force employers to consider their grievances. Instead, it allows employers
to consider grievances from individuals without violating section 8(a)(5). 218
While the Court's decision may appear narrow, it finds some support in the
legislative history21 9 and seems justified by the mere placement of the language.
Thus, the proviso qualifies language granting the union the right of exclusive
representation and seems to say that, notwithstanding the employer's obliga-
tion to deal with the union, it can, without violating that duty, consider the
grievances of individual employees.
Gorman and Finkin recognize the limitations of the proviso, but argue that
Emporium Capwell is not dispositive of an individual employee's right to
complain. That is, even though the employer may refuse to consider a grievance
under section 9(a), "nothing in the Act suggests it should be permitted to
discharge an employee for attempting to make that presentation.""22 Despite
their position, however, nothing in the Act suggests that employees have an
unfettered right to present grievances to their employer. Section 9(a) is not
an affirmative grant of employee power. Rather, the right recognized there
is merely illustrative of the protection granted by section 7. In order to receive
the shelter of the Act, then, an individual's complaint must qualify as protected
concerted activity.
Reading section 9(a) as an affirmative grant of power would mean that
unionized employees-who already have the support and protection of
unions-could individually petition their employer while unorganized employees
are relegated to the rights afforded by section 7. Not only does the legislative
216. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 355-57.
217. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
218. Id. at 61 n.12.
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219. The 1947 amendments added to section 9(a) the language authorizing adjustment of in-
dividual grievances if not inconsistent with the labor contract. Of the amendment, the House
Report says: "The bill further adds to the freedom of workers by permitting them not only
to present grievances to their employers ... but also to settle the grievances .. " H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MAAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 298 (1948) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited
as LMRA LEGISLATrvE HISTORY]. The House floor managers' statement in the Conference Report
reads: "Both the House bill and the Senate amendment amended section 9(a) ... to specifically
authorize employers to settle grievances presented by individual employees .. " H.R. RP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATrvE HISTORY, supra, at
550 (statement of House managers).
Both of these passages, cited by the Court in Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61 n.12, seem
to indicate that the purpose of the amendment was to shield the employer from unfair labor
practice liability, not to create affirmative rights in employees.
220. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 357 (emphasis in the original).
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history reveal no intention on the part of Congress to create such an anomaly,
nothing in the policy of the Act argues for it. Indeed, the right of non-union
employees to petition their employers should be superior to that of employees
represented by a union.
As argued elsewhere in this article, nonunion employees should be eligible
for the protection of section 7 when they individually present to their employer,
or otherwise protest, a matter which is of common concern to a group. The
principal purpose of protecting such concerted protests is to foster unioniza-
tion. Unionization, however, does not confer special benefits upon individual
workers. It merely allows them to combine forces with their colleagues in
order to better confront their employer. All the section 9(a) proviso does is
recognize that unionized employees have some opportunity to present
grievances, just as nonunion workers have; it does not create a new broader
right.
Having selected the union as their bargaining agent, organized employees
have forfeited the right to bargain on their own. As the decision in Emporium
Capwell makes clear, neither individuals nor subgroups within the bargaining
unit have any right to bargain with their employer."' Nor do they have any
right to force their employer to consider their grievances by refusing to work
or otherwise. Given the narrowness of the Supreme Court's interpretation in
Emporium Capwell, section '9(a) should mean nothing more than that
individuals have the right to use whatever grievance-arbitration procedure is
established by contract without the intervention of the bargaining agent.
If the contract does not create a grievance-arbitration procedure, unionized
employees should have the same right to present grievances that nonunion
employees have since neither the employer nor the union can justifiably rely
on any exclusive contractual mechanism. If there is such a mechanism, section
9(a) guarantees that, notwithstanding any action on the part of the union,
employees shall have the right to attempt use of the procedure, without
suffering adverse consequences from the employer. In City Disposal, then,
employee Brown's action would have been concerted (and protected) had he
attempted to file a grievance over his employer's direction to drive the truck.
Moreover, his employer could have considered his complaint without violating
section 8(a)(5). Brown's refusal to work, however, and any other action
calculated to force employer consideration of an individual grievance should
not be deemed activity protected by either section 7 or section 9(a).
III. CONCLUSION
Both the Alleluia progeny and Gorman and Finkin's article were reactions
221. The Court found unprotected the concerted protest of employees that ignored the grievance
procedure provided by contract and, instead, sought to force the employer to bargain with a
minority. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 65-70.
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to the harshness of the common law employment-at-will doctrine.22  Faced
with a rule that permits employers to discharge employees without reason,
the temptation is strong to fashion some protection for the employees. The
NLRB, which plays an important role in protecting employee freedom, seemed
a likely place to turn. By creating concert where none exists, or worse, by
reading the requirement out of the Act altogether, one can overcome the im-
pediment to Board jurisdiction and allow that agency to assess the wisdom
of employer action under the guise of protecting the employees' right to
organize. The Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal symbolizes the same
instinct. Not content to leave enforcement of collectively bargained rights to
the union and the employer, the Court's decision interposes the Board as the
guardian of employee freedom.
Neither Alleluia nor Gorman and Finkin reached a proper accommodation
between the respective rights and obligations of unions, employers, and
employees and the underlying policy of the NLRA. And, unfortunately, the
Board missed its opportunity to rectify Alleluia with its harsh opinion in
Meyers. Even more unfortunate is City Disposal, which not only ignored the
nature of collectively bargained rights, but also thrust the Board into the
unaccustomed role of contract interpreter. The Board, however, should not
have the expansive role suggested for it by Gorman and Finkin or given to
it by City Disposal.
The Board's primary function is to ensure that the avenues to collective
bargaining remain open. In a nonunion workplace, the Board not only protects
employees against discrimination on account of union sympathies, but also
serves the more important role of protecting incipient group activity. By pro-
tecting small groups, and even by safeguarding individuals who have the
courage to speak over matters of mutual interest, the Board fosters an
environment where employees can freely turn their common concerns in the
direction of collective bargaining.
Once the employees select a bargaining representative, however, the Board's
role changes. The Board has neither the expertise nor the statutory authority
to define or implement the substantive terms of employment. Nor does it exist
to protect employees against all employer wrongdoing. Instead, its function
is to safeguard collective bargaining so that employees can protect themselves.
The rigidity of the Meyers opinion hinders the ability of the employees to
choose collective bargaining. Even worse, City Disposal undermines the pro-
cess itself by substituting the Board for the union in the role of contract
enforcer.
222. In fact, in the early party of their article, Gorman and Finkin refer to the lack of protection
for nonunion employees and note that "their only protection will lie with the National Labor
Relations Board." Gorman & Finkin, supra note 4, at 288.
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